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INTRODUCTION 
As late as 1953 John Wild was a dedicated realist. His two books on 
Plato and his Introduction to Realistic Philosophy indicate his interest in 
this type of thinking. But by 1959 his attitude had changed. In that year 
his book, Human Freedom and Social Order, appeared and he showed himself to be 
a philosopher of the Lebenswelt, often in opposition to realism. 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine why he changed his 
attitude. To accomplish this I will make an exegesis first of his realism 
and then of his Lebenswelt philosophy. In this way it will become manifest 
how they are related and how they differ. Finally, I will show how he 
criticizes realism from his Lebenswelt position in order to make the difference 
even mote explicit. In thus describing his two positions the reasons for his 
transition will be laid bare. 
His realistic period divides into two phases. He begins as a 
commentator on Plato and an exponent of the traditional realistic position. 
I shall indicate his attitude at this time by considering his treatment of 
Plato as the originator of the natural law theory. But, yet still as a 
realist, he then takes an interest in the existentialists and writes his 
book, The Challenge of Existentialism. To explain this phase of his thought 
I shall show how he thinks of existentialism as an appendage of realism. 
Finally, he finds it necessary to leave the realistic position and 
become a Lebenswelt philosopher. I shall consider his reasons for this when 
~ summarize his book Human Freedom and Social Order in the third part of this 
ii 
thesis. In the fourth part, I shall show in greater.detail just how he 
philosophizes about the Lebenswelt. 
The fifth part of this thesis will be to contrast his concept~on of 
realism with that of Lebenswelt philosophy. In seeing how he criticizes 
Thomism we shall understand even more clearly what his transition has meant. 
For in criticizing Thomism, Wild II is in effect criticizing Wild I. 
iii 
CHAPTER I: REALISTIC PERIOD 
In his Introduction to Realistic Philosophy Wild gives a convenient 
summary of what he means by realism. He writes that the three basic doctrines 
of realistic philosophy are: "(l) There is a world of real existence which men 
have not made or constructed; (2) this real existence can be known by the 
(1) 
human conduct, individual and social." Rather than examine what Wild means 
by each of these statements we shall consider only the last and thus give a 
sample of his realistic philosophy. In doing this, we shall even further limit 
our attention to considering why he thought Plato was a natural law ethician. 
In this way we can understand the type of contribution Wild made to realism. 
When treating this question in Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory 
of Natural Law, Wild first develops a concept of the Natural Law and then shows 
how the characteristics of this concept are to be found in Plato's thought. We 
shall here follow his division. 
After describing certain misconceptions of the natural law theory, 
Wild begins his positive explanation by showing how it is founded on a 
realistic ontology. Thus he writes, 
(1) John D. Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p.6. 
(2) John D. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 105. 
(3) Ibid. p. 107. 
I 
"The philosophers of natural law are moral realists. They hold that 
certain moral norms are grounded on nature, not merely on human 
decree. It is this thesis that binds together the various strands 
into a single tradition and which radically separates all of them 
from the subjectivist schools of modern thought." (4) 
Wild thinks that ''its norms are grounded on the inescapable pattern of 
existence itself." (5) The term 'nature' which refers to this normative 
order includes five basic characteristics which Wild thinks occur constantly 
in the natural law tradition. These characteristics are: 
"(l) the world is governed by a normative order embedded in the very 
being of its component entities; (2) each finite entity is marked by 
an intelligible structure distinguishing it from other entities, and 
by a universal law; (3) the composite structure of any finite entity 
also includes an active factor of dynamism or tendency which urges it 
towards further existence not yet acquired; (4) when a concrete 
tendency is ordered to act in accordance with the law described 
under 2, this action is natural or right; and (5) good, in the most 
general sense, is the realization of tendency, evil the lack of 
· fulfillment." (6) 
When these meanings are applied to man 
"they entail three moral doctrines which are characteristic of 
realistic ethics. (1) The moral law, which is the abstract pattern 
of such activation, is in no sense an arbitrary construction based 
on human wish or decree. It is founded on the specific nature of 
man and the essential tendencies determined by this nature. Hence 
it is not merely a moral law in the usual sense of this word, but 
a law of nature, applying equally to all men everywhere. (2) Human 
nature is incomplete or tendential. In order to fulfill these 
tendencies, human acts must be governed by certain general rules 
applying to all men alike. In subhuman animals this direction 
proceeds automatically and for the most part without cognitive 
activity. But in man it requires the exercise of rational 
reflection and choice, free from automatic determination and 
(4) John D. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 105. 
(5) Ibid., p. 107. 
(6) Ibid., p. 137. 
2 
physical constraint. Violations of natural law are punished by 
natural sanctions of distortion and privation. Acts which are in 
accordance with natural law are commonly referred to as virtues. 
Such acts are not means to a final value from which they are 
separate. They are themselves included in this final activation 
and are, therefore, ends in themselves. Finally, (3) the human 
good is the existential fulfillment of the human individual. Since 
each individual shares certain traits with other members of the 
species, this fulfillment will include two distinguishable aspects:-
(a) acts elicited by his peucliar characteristics and circumstances; 
and (b) acts required for the completion of common tendencies he 
shares with other members of the species." (7) 
In order to verify this theory Wild examines the ethics of the 
early Stoics, Marcus Aurelius, Aquinas, Hooker,Grotius and Thomas Paine to 
see if his eight points are there contained. He goes to the texts of these 
men and offers many quotations in favor of this theory. Thus, he shows in 
an historical way what the natural law theory is. By way of contrast he 
considers the case of Hobbes and Locke and points out that neither of them 
are true natural law ethicians even though they use the terms of the 
tradition. They fail to conform to the five criteria. 
Finally Wild asks himself if these five characteristics can be found 
within the thought of Plato and if Plato really initiated this type of think-
ing. Wild begins his treatment of these questions by pointing out that the 
common opinion attributes the founding of the natural law to the Stoics. He 
writes that the Opinion can be traced back to the German codifier, Samuel 
Pufendorf, who initiated it in 1743. 
(7) Ibid., p. 108-109. 
3 
-The two primary objections against the Platonic origination of 
~he natural law theory are: (1) the term 'law of nature' occurs but seldom 
in Plato's works and (2) it is implied that the natural law is a theological 
trather than a philosophical theory. Wild answers these by explaining that a 
~oncept may be expressed in different terms and that Plato could have had a 
natural law theory even though he rarely used the term 'law of nature'. Next, 
he argues that the natural law is purely philosophical and points out that 
Grotius thought a natural law ethic could be established even if it were 
assumed there was no God. 
After treating these objections, Wild shows why he thinks Plato 
~sed the concept of nature in the five ways characteristic of the natural law 
tradition. First he gives a series of quotations from such dialogues as the 
Protagoras, Phaedo, Parmenides, Gorgias, and Laws, to show that Plato thought 
of nature as a normative world order. Typical of his treatment is the 
following: 
"Book X of the Laws gives us the final and most explicit statement of 
Plato's theory of Natural Law. It contains a complex argument for the 
priority of rational life over lifeless matter as the first moving 
principle or nature of the cosmos. ;We are told that the materialists 
wish to identify this principle (f VC!I) with earth, or air, or fire. 
But they do not use the term rightly since as a matter of fact soul 
or life is the first moving principle, and therefore, "in a special 
sense exists by nature." (8) 
"This cosmic order of nature carried its own norms within it. That 
which deviates is eliminated. In the case of men who are capable of 
exercising choice in the matter, those who would be happy must order 
their lives in accordance with natural law: those who seek power in 
the madness of hubris are justly punished by frustration of a natural 
(8) Ibid., p. 139. 
4 
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law founded on the very nature of things and. thus enforced by natural 
sanctions. Nature determines what modes of being are good for a thing, 
whatever it may be, and also their order of greater or lesser importancE 
Thus, wealth is to be sought only for the sake of the body, and the 
welfare of the body for the sake of the soul; and this order of 
subordination exists by nature." (9) 
Second, he develops Plato's concept -of nature as the 'eidetic' 
structure of concrete entities. The burden of his argument here is to point 
out how Plato uses the term nature to refer to the form or Idea "which 
determines each thing to be of a certain kind and distinguishes it from other 
kinds." (10) He shows how Plato uses the term 'nature' in this way in the 
Phaedrus, Republic and Philebus. For example, in the Phaedrus "when the 
charioteer sees a very beautiful object, he is reminded of 'the nature of 
the beautiful.'" (11) Thus, 'nature' in this sense means the essential what-
ness of a thing, the structure which determines it, and distinguishes it 
from other entities." (12) 
Third, Wild treats what he calls Plato's concept of nature as a 
formally determined tendency. Here he argues that Plato uses the term 'nature' 
to refer to something more than just the form or essence of a thing. He 
thinks that nature includes other structural factors than form which deter-
mines the concrete thing ''to change and to interact with other entities in 
certain appropriate ways." (13) He writes that, "there is hardly a page in 
( 9) Ibid., p. 139' quoting Plato, Laws 870 B 4-5. 
(10) Ibid., P· 140. 
(11) Ibid., p. 141, quoting Plato, Phaedrus 254B. 
(12) Ibid., P· 141. 
(13) Ibid., P· 141. 
-Plato which does not either explicitly express or imply" (14) the notion that 
finite things have an unfinished or tendential character. For example, 
"Pure forms such as equality and justice are never wholly present 
in the concrete beings which only partake of them. Nevertheless, 
the forms are somehow partially present in their imitations, 
seeking and tending to perfect themselves so far as possible." (15) 
So, "In this more inclusive sense, the nature of any entity refers not 
only to its essential structure, but to the active dispositions and 
tendencies determined by the structure." (16) 
These tendencies can be on the subrational level but reason too has its 
,, 
tendencies. '"By its very nature (ytiof.t) every human soul beholds real 
being.'" (17) It alone can lead us to the human good. 
Fourth, in order to tell us how this reason is determined, Wild 
treats nature as the correct ordering of incipient tendency. He begins by 
I 
telling how virtue (0~t{~) is a universal ontological category which refers to 
a thing's excellence. In so far as each thing completes or fulfills itself, 
it has virtue. Virtue is "'the power of attainging what is good.'" (18) 
!Whereas "virtues are automatic" (19) in subhuman beings, men "must order their 
initial tendencies by habits which are largely under their own control." (20) 
Now the standard of rightness to which men must conform in order 
to live virtuously is nature. Right action is described as agreeing with 
(14) Ibid., p. 141. (15) Ibid., p. 142. 
(16) Ibid. , p. 142. (17) Ibid., P· 143, quoting 
Plato, Phaedrus 249 E. 
(18) Ibid., p. 144, quoting Plato,Meno 78 c 1. 
(19) Ibid., p. 144. 
(20) Ibid., p. 144. 
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riature. The ideal community controlled by genuine wisdom is referred to as a 
"citY which would be established in accordance with nature." (21) 
Fifth, Wild asks himself what is the relation between virtue and 
goodness in Plato's thought and in order to find his answer he examines nature 
as existential fulfillment. He first analyzes a series of passages from Plato 
concerning good and evil and concludes that there is an intimate relation 
between virtue and goodness. In fact they are so closely fused together that 
Plato often considers them as one. But they are distinct. "Goodness is ful-
fillment -- the actual being and full possession of realization." (22) "Virtue 
is the inner power to act and exist in accordance with nature." (23) Thus, 
virtue is the chief cause of good. Finite goodness is the actualizing of 
virtue. "Virtue is included in goodness as its most essential part, as a 
power is included in its realization." (24) Goodness is an existential 
category of realization and fulfillment made possible by virtue. 
But one achieves goodness only when he acts according to a certain 
norm. Plato tells us what is meant by such a norm or the real nature of an 
entity in the Philebus. Commenting on this Wild writes, 
"'If we wish to discover the nature (tyu'~1S) of any form--the hard for 
(21) Ibid., p. 145, quoting Rep. 428 E 9. What Plato actually says is that 
a city established according to nature would be wise as a whole because 
of the wisdom that resides in the city's ruling element. 
(22) Ibid., p. 149, quoting Symposium 206 A 6, 205 A. Here Plato is saying that 
men are lovers of the good and that they long for it to be their's for-
ever. Plato does not stress any relation between virtue and goodness 
here. 
(23) Ibid., p. 149. (24) Ibid., p. 149. 
7 
instance--we should look at the hardest, rather than the least.hard.' 
All changing things are incomplete and tendential. To find out what 
i~~at the root of their tendencies, therefore, we should look at those 
examples which are 'most extreme and most intense.' Human nature will 
be observed at its best in those individuals who have pushed their 
capacities to the very breaking point. Here we shall find the most 
complete and authentic human life.'" (25) 
A natural law ethics '~ust hold that existence is radically good 
__ that evil is privation." (26) Plato has this notion and it is expressed in 
the fifth way he uses the term 'nature'. 
After thus describing the ontological presuppositions of 
Platonic ethics, Wild now considers .. the three derived moral principles. 
First, he shows that Plato thinks that the natural law is 
universal for all men. While establishing this thesis, he attacks the 
accusation of Popper who claims that Plato is a racialist and that Plato 
thought of the Greeks as masters and the Barbarians as slaves in much the 
same manner as a Nazi would distinguish Aryan and non-Aryan. This attack 
makes Wild furious and he sets out to debunk it by commenting on certain 
Platonic myths. Thus, from pages 25 to 30 and on pages 152 and 153 of 
Plato' Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Wild shows in detail 
what we might summarize by means of some excerpts as follows: 
"Thus in the Timaeus all souls are said to have been made according 
to one formula, and the myth of the Politicus speaks of the whole 
human flock and of one divine shepherd." (27) 
(25) Ibid., pp. 147-148, quoting Philebus 44 E. 
(26) Ibid., p. 151. Wild's development of this fifth way seems weak. His 
quotations concerning virtue and goodness are difficult to substantiate 
in Plato. It would seem that evil as privation came from St.Augustine. 
(27) Ibid., p. 153. 
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"In the Meno virtue is applied equally to men and women in general--
to young and old, to bond and free, and finally to 1 all human 
creatures.' Plato's discussions of virtue, of philosophy, of law, 
and of the soul are uniformly permeated with a universal feeling. 
Thus, the philosopher-king thesis of the Republic asserts that unless 
philosophers are kings, there will be no end of troubles for all of 
mankind. The Republic claims to be not merely a Hellenic ideal, but 
one for man in general, barbarian as well as Greek. The subject of 
the Phaedo is not the soul of Greeks or Persians but the soul of man. 
The unwritten laws of nature hold universally and underlie the 
written positive laws of every genuinely human community." (28) 
"Plato certainly believed in the moral unity of man. This is proved 
by the myths of creation, and by countless passages which may be 
quoted from his discussions of the human soul and of wisdom and 
virtue, which are the same everywhere for all men." (29) 
Second, Wild shows how Plato thought ethical norms are grounded 
9 
in nature or how his "conception of virtuous action is founded on his conceptior 
of human nature." (30) To accomplish this he conunents on Plato's concept of 
virtue as it is found in the first book of the Republic. First he shows how 
Plato thinks of virtue as a general ontological category. Any nature which 
"'I( 
fulfills its proper function (£t'(~ v) is virtuous. Next, he points out that, 
"The human soul, the animating principle of the human body, is no 
exception. It has a certain nature which determines it to certain 
modes of action, it organ, which it alone can perform, such as 
managing and deliberating, which are specifically mentioned. The 
effective performance of these natural functions is virtue: their 
warping and distortion is vice." (31) 
Finally Wild shows how Plato's concept of duty or obligation is based upon his 
understanding of nature and virtue. Man has a duty to act in such a way that 
he fulfills his nature. He should fulfill his real needs and for this reason, 
human society is formed.· 
(28) Ibid., p. 153, From Meno 73 a-d, Rep.473 D., Rep. 499C, Laws 793 B. 
(29) Ibid., p. 30. (30) Ibid., p. 153 (31) Ibid., p. 154. 
"The real creator of the city is our human need, a phrase repeated 
in practically the same words by Hooker and other def enders of 
natural law. Later on, these common human needs were referred to 
as human rights, in distinction from incidental appetities. Plato 
does not use this terminology. But the concept is clearly and 
unambiguously stated." (32) 
Third, Wild shows how Plato thought that man's good lies in the 
realization of his human nature. He begins his treatment by commenting on 
Plato's words: '"whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, 
10 
and in all ways has no further need of anything, but is completely sufficient." 
(33) Wild tells how Plato thought that original nature is in a state of 
deficiency and that the good is the overcoming of this deficiency. Thus, the 
good is always complete or sufficient. Next, he shows how moral vice is 
analogous to disease in the body and how virtue or goodness is like health. 
Plato thought of men as complex beings with many functions. None of these 
functions could be fulfilled properly unless they were all hierarchically 
subordinated and working in proper order. 
writes, 
"When insubordination and conflict arise, no part can properly perform 
its orgon, and the entity remains in a deprived or evil state. Moral 
vice or disorder is thus analogous to disease in the body ... All of 
this is clearly exemplified and explicitly ~tated in an interesting 
passage at the end of the Fourth Book of the Republic." (34) 
In concluding his treatment of Plato and the natural law, Wild 
"The texts show that Plato held firmly to three basic tenets of the 
philosophy of natural law: first, that the general pattern of 
virtuous action required for this is the same for all men everywhere; 
second, that certain virtuous modes of action are founded on human 
nature just as the healthy functioning of the body is founded on its 
(32) Ibid., p. 154. (33) Ibid., p. 154; quoting Philebus 60 C. 
(34) Ibid., p. 155, from Rep. 443 ff. 
physical structure; and third, that the end' of man is the realization 
or completion of this nature. Some vague conception of moral law is 
doubtless as old as man himself. But in the West at least, Plato was 
the first philosopher to work out an exact and coherent theory of 
natural law. (35) 
Such is a typical example of the work Wild did during the first 
part of his realistic period. He was primarily an historian and commentator. 
He tried to explicate the philosophy of what he called the realistic tradition. 
He usually did this in opposition to philosophers of idealistic or positivistic 
persuasion. 
In the Spring of 1953, Wild delivered the Mahlon Powell Lectures 
at Indiana University. The argument of these lectures has been published in 
his book, The Challenge of Existentialism. Here we find a transition stage 
in his career when he is moving from realism toward a philosophy of the 
Lebenswelt. However, at this period he is still a convinced realist and even 
though he has begun to appreciate the discoveries of the existentialists, 
he criticizes them from a realistic viewpoint. 
In this part of my thesis I shall show how wild was still a 
realist when he gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures, but how he had moved to the 
second phase of his realistic period, namely, that of existentialism. I shall 
show how he considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism. In order 
to accomplish this, I shall·make three considerations. First, I shall examine 
a series of quotations taken from The Challenge of Existentialism which 
(35) Ibid. , p. 155, 156. 
indicate that he thought existentialism was a part of the realistic tradition. 
d I shall examine his concepts of existentialism ar..d phenomenology to secon ' 
see how he related these to realism. Third, I shall consider his concept of 
existentialist ontology to see why he thought that this was a new empericism 
and a revival of traditional ontology. In limiting myself to these three 
considerations, I shall have to leave out his treatment of epistemology and 
ethics. But, in spite of this, I can still accomplish my purpose -- to see 
why. he thought of existentialism as an aspect of realism. 
Right from.the beginning of his Book, Wild's purpose is clear. 
He wants to show how philosophy that has been broken down by non-empirical 
and anti-metaphysical theories can be restored by existentialism and a return 
to realism. In his first chapter, The Breakdown of Modern Philosophy, he 
describes metaphysics as he dici in the first phase of his realism. He tells 
that it deals with existence whether potential and actual, or substantial and 
accidental. (36) Then he writes "at the present time in the universities of 
England and America, this discipline is dead." (37) Of course, epistemology 
and ethics have met with a like disaster. Practical awareness which deals 
with existential problems has been disregarded by those who focus their 
attention upon pure theory rather than practise, on essence rather than 
existence. (38) These theories eventually end in skepticism where they are 
cut off from the concrete world. And in turn this epistemological skepticism 
(36) Jehn D. Wild, The Challenge of Existentialisn;, Bloor.ling ton: Indiana U. 
Press, 1959; p. 16. 
(37) Ibic., p. 17. (38) Ibid., p. 20. 
12 
Ir weakens mcral convkticn. (39) 
13 
Some philosophers think "it is a naive.mistake 
to telieve that any such thing as ethics exists as a responsible discipline." 
(40) 
Wild thinks that existentialism and reci.lism can remeby these 
problems. Existentialism is a rE:birth cf realism and if it is purified by the 
traditional philosophy a true metaphysics a.rid its consequent epistemology and 
ethics will be restored. Wild begins to prove this thesis by showing how 
Kierkegaard is, in a certain sense, a realist. lie po]nts out that even though 
Ki.erkega2.rd made bitter atta.cks upon theoretical reason and claimed to be an 
irrationalist, we cannot take this irrationalism seriously, for we would then 
"have to reject his w"Titings, which are a triumph of theoretical analysis." (41 
Wild thinks that even though, 
"this irrationalism is the most urfortunate yet one of tte most 
influential factors in Kierkegaard's testament to the modern age •.. 
we are now able to see that Kierkegaard's achievE:ments are rather a 
triumph of rational description and analysis." (42) 
Concerning existentialism Wild further writes, "or .. the conti.Pent 
of Europe this is now the dominant philosophy, and a challenge to all living 
minds. Its point of view is starkly realistic.'' (43) However, Wild as a 
realist is not completely pleased with existentialism and his criticisms of 
this philosophy indicate that he is still very much a realist at the time he 
gave the Mahlon Powell Lectures. He writes, 
{39) Ibid., p. 23. 
(42) Ibid., p. 54. 
(40) Ibid.~ p. 24. 
(43) Ibie.,p. 55. 
(41) Ibiri., p. 54. 
Irr' -----~~~~~~· 
I I "The existentialist insightf:. are marked ty partiality at every· one of 
the four levels we have considered ... We shall turn. briefly again to 
the chief sources of existentialist thought for a critical review ... 
We shall consider these (its more serious errors) as they affect the 
four major aspects cf existenti2list thought: its method, its meta-
physics, its view of krowledge, and finally, its ethics. In each of 
these phases, ~e shall find that it suffers from omission, exaggera-
tion, and sometimes from positive error." (44) 
He goes on to show in detail he~ this philosophy is man-centered to the exclu-
sion of the rest of the world, how brute facts are only described and not 
explained, how it denies the principle of causality, and how Sartre, therefore, 
has no ethics. He attempts to show how it has slurred over essences in think-
ing that existence is given without essence and how as a result it is anti-
intellectual. He thinks that the gerrr:s of ske.pt:l.cism are found in Kierkegaard 
c:rnd th2.t his followers often terld toward moral solipsism and anarchy. "No 
14 
adequate or even noteworthy social philosophy has as yet come from existential-
ist sources." (45) 
After his criticism he further indicates that he thinks realism 
and existentialism can be cne by showing hm1' existentialism can overcome its 
weaknesses by becoming allied with realism. Thus he writes, 
"In these concludir.g chapters, we shall rr,ake a few suggestions con-
cerning the way in which, as it seems to t~s, the genuin.e insights 
of this new phjlosophy may be sustained by bringing them into 
relation with the allied insights of realism." (46) 
Wild's equaticn of rea]ism and exister..tialism will become more 
meaningful if we now consider wtat he meant by phenomenology and existentialism 
at this pojnt in his career. In orcier tc cio tl:is, we shall begin by commenti.ng 
on thrEe quotations which will indicate how he related phenomenology and 
(44) Ibid., p. 178. (45) Ibid., p. 184. (46) Ibid., p. 187. 
existe.nti2.lisrr. 'lhe:n, we shall consider his idea thc:.t existentialism is 
primarily concerned with l:uman existence. And finally, we shall show how he 
relates existentialism and realism. 
Wild writes that the men who use the phenomenological method 
are interested 
15 
"in the concrete data of irr.mediate experience, and in discribing those 
data so far as possible, exactly as they are given." (L,7) 
Then he ·wr:.i.te.s that the existentialists have. 
"applied this method to many regions not previously explored, but 
especially to the pervasive data of existence, awareness, and human 
value which lie at the root of the disciplines of metaphysics, 
epistemology and ethics." (48) 
And again he writes, 
"there is no real reason why phenomenology should be restricted to 
human existence. Other modes of being can also be described and 
analyzed." (49) 
These quotations are typical of Wild's thought at this time and he constantly 
repeats the ideas contained within them. If we examine them, we see that he 
thinks of phenomenology as an attitude of interest in the concrete and as a 
method of description. Also, the last quotation indicates that phenomenology 
includes some kind of analysis. The existentialists are phenomenologists in 
so far as they describe and analyze human existence. Hence, we can see that 
· phenomenology and existentialism are different in that .the first is a method 
the latter uses and which could possibly be used by others. They are alike in 
that they can both treat the immediate data of human existence. 
At this point, Wild does not indicate much appreciation for 
( 4 7) Ibid . , p . 5 7 . (48) Ibid., P: 57. (49) Ibid., p. 58. 
16 
Husserl and his technical meaning of phenomenology. He only mentions 
Husserl twice by name and the first time he criticizes him for being an 
essentialist.(50) However, Wild does have one passage wherein he indicates 
what he means phenomenological description and analysis. He writes, 
"The first step in the attainment of such truth is the use of all 
our cognitive faculties--feeling, sense, and reason--in the descrip-
tion of objects as they are given. The next step is to analyze out 
the essential aspects of these complex data, and the relation forms in 
which they are united. These belong to what we call phenomenology. 
At every stage, our eyes are fixed on the object we are describing. 
No inference must be allowed to creep into the picture. No fixed 
interpretation should warp our view. Our attention is focused 
sclely on the existing phenomena as they are present to us, and on 
the constitutive structure of this presence. When this has been 
accurately achieved, we have already embarked on the last phase of 
the process, the quest for explanation in terms of reasons and 
causes." (51) 
Wild goes on to call this last phase an "inferential theory that penetrates 
far beyond the horizons revealed by our practical activity." (52) Hence, it 
would seem that Wild pictures philosophical reasoning as having three phases. 
First, there is description, and second, analysis. These are included within 
phenomenology. Third, there is inference which the existentialists lack. But, 
before we consider how realism can provide this, we must first take up Wild's 
notion that existentialism is primarily concerned with human existence. 
Wild thinks that the primary characteristic of existentialism 
is its concern for human existence. Thus he writes, 
"When we regard man from an ontological point of view, we find that he 
is marked off from other beings not merely by certain determinate 
traits (essences), but by a peculiar mode of being which marks him 
(50) Ibid., p. 73. (51) Ibid., p. 193. . (52) Ibid. p. 194. 
off even more radically. This human way of being is now called 
existence, and has given its name to the new philosophy we are 
studying." (53) 
In order to understand what he means by this we must now examine 
his concept of existential ontology. In so doing, we will see in more detail 
why he thinks existentialism and realism can be one and we will be able to see 
how he thinks realism can help existentialism to be even more ontological. 
He begins his treatment of existential metaphysics by showing how 
it is a radical empiricism. By this lable, he designates a philosophical 
position which is neither pan-objectivistic (e.g. positivism) nor pan-
subjectivistic (e.g. Cartesianism). The new empiricism (·explicitly rejects 
the reduction of everything to either object or subject. Instead it insists 
upon an intentional notion of consciousness such that there must always be a 
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subject and object pole. In order to prove this statement, Wild qv.otes certain 
passages from Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel. Then, he 
comments on these passages to show how these existentialists are true empiri-
cists as opposed to pseudo-empiricists such as Russell. Finally, he shows how 
their radical empiricism at least enables them to begin philosophizing in a 
correct way since they are treating being as it is. But, I will not give the 
detail of Wild's argument since one example will suffice to show his method. 
Rather, I will give that detail now in showing how he thinks existentialism 
has revived ontology. 
Wild begins the part of his book entitled The Revival of Ontology 
(53) Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
with the words, 
"One result of the new empiricism is the rediscovery of those pervasive 
protocols which require ontological analysis and explanation. This 
means that metaphysics can no longer be dismissed as a jumble of 
purely speculative theories which are subject to no empirical check." 
(54) 
The existential protocols which Wild explains by commenting on the words of 
the five leading existentialists are: essence and existence, existential 
vectors, truth as identity, good and evil, contradiction and contingency, 
potency and change. As an example of the method by which Wild proceeds 
throughout the book we shall now consider his treatment of essence and 
existence. He begins, 
"The existentialists clearly recognize the classical distinction 
between determinate structure, or essence, and the act of existing. 
But in violent reaction against the essentialism of modern thought, 
these thinkers all place an extreme emphasis on existence, and agree 
in asserting its priority over essence. Thus, Heidegger says that 
'the 'essence' of man lies in his existence.' He uses the term 
Dasein in order to express not a determinate whatness (essence) but 
rather a mode of being (sein) always proceeding from a certain 
position (da) into which he has been thrown." (55) 
Such is the way in which Wild begins to argue that Heidegger has 
contributed to the revival of ontology. However, I think that in Wild's inter-
pretation, there is a fundamental misunderstanding. Wild would seem to equate 
Heideggers'use of existence with the traditional use of existence. However, 
Heidegger writes explicitly that he does not make such an equation. 
"But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to 
designate the Being of this entity as 'existence' (Existenz), this 
term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the 
traditional term 'existentia'; ontologically, existentia is 
(54) Ibid. , p. 64. (55) Ibid., p.65, quoting Sein 
und Zeit, p. 42. 
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tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is 
essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character." (56) 
Furthermore, it seems that Heidegger would be an essentialist 
in the way that Wild is using the term, for when he writes "the 'essence' of 
nasein lies in its existence" he means that he is setting man off from other 
entities by means of this characteristic of existence. Even though this 
ability to-be-there is not a 'what',it is still more like the traditional 
essence than the traditional existence. 
I do not mean to say that I think that Heidegger has not promoted 
a revival of ontology. However, I think that concerning this issue, Wild has 
misrepresented him. 
Next, Wild shows how Heidegger thinks that man's existence is 
prior to what he is. He writes, "Dasein is always ahead of himself. He is 
his possibilities, and in his being somehow understands them. He chooses how 
he is going to be." (57) But, Wild feels uneasy with Heidegger's notion that 
Dasein has no determinate structure. He writes, 
"Heidegger does not explain fully why the realistic notion of essence 
or nature is inadequate to express these existential characteristics. 
He simply states dogmatically that it applies only to inert things 
that are simply there on hand before us." (58) 
Two observations are in order here. First, Wild might understand 
Heidegger on this issue if he saw that Heidegger does not equate the 
(56) Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by Macquarrie and Robinson, 
New York and Evanston, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 68. 
(57) Ibid., p. 66. (58) Ibid., p. 66. 
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existence of Dasein with the existence of traditional realism. In short, as 
M'ild writes but does not understand, "the 'essence of Dasein lies in its 
existence." Dasein does have an essence, a determining characteristic. Dasein 
is distinct from other entities in that he is indetermined, he is free to 
determine himself. -
Second, it can again be pointed out how Wild is here a realist. 
In so far as the existentialist fits into the mold of realism, Wild praises 
him. In so far as he does not Wild criticizes him. Sometimes, as in this 
case, Wild, in his eagerness to have the existentialist promoting the cause of 
realism, is even unfair in his treatment of the existentialist. He sees too 
much of traditional realism in his thought. 
After showing Heidegger's thought on the distinction between 
essence and existence,Wild then quotes Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel and 
attempts to show how they too recognize the distinction. He criticizes 
Sartre and Jaspers in the same way he did Heidegger and then he shows how 
Marcel has "come out with a qualified defense of the notion of essence." (59) 
He quotes Marcel as saying, 
'"It is clear that reflection on the meanings of words must be 
directed, just as Plato wanted it to be, towards a grasp of what 
traditional philosophers used to call essences. One cannot protest 
too strongly against a kind of existentialism, or a kind of carica-
ture of existentialism which claims to deprive the notion of 
essence of its old value and to allow it only a subordinate 
position." (60) 
(59) Ibid., p.66. (60) Ibid., p. 66; quoting Marcel, Man against society? 
p. 85. 
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Then Wild writes, 
"This is a significant criticism by one who has a thorough command of 
·the literature. Determinate structure is certainly found in 
experience. This pervasive factor cannot be permanently evaded and 
ignored by any philosophy which seriously hopes to be really 
empirical and to achieve even a minimum degree of intelligibility." 
(61) 
Wild treats the other existential protocols in this same way. 
By existential vectors he refers to 'Being-in-the-world', 'Being-with-others', 
and 'Being-towards-my-death'. He thinks that these are "new complex concepts 
which express the relational structure of being." (62) The existentialists 
forged these because of their respect for concrete data and in so doing they 
have rejected on phenomenological grounds that monistic idealism which is 
incompatible with "that personal existence and freedom which is a primary 
object of existentialist study." (63) Thus in refuting a form of idealism, 
existentialism has furthered the cause of traditional realism. Wild argues 
in the same way concerning the existentialist treatment of truth, goodness, 
contingency and change. 
Throughout his entire book, Wild treats four aspects of phil-
osophy: method, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. He attempts to show in 
each case how the findings of the existentialists have contributed to the 
traditional realistic understanding of these aspects of philosophy. Whenever, 
the existentialists do not agree with that tradition, Wild criticizes them. 
We have seen an example of his approach in our consideration of his treatment 
(61) Ibid., p. 66. (62) Ibid., p. 67. (63) Ibid., p. 68 
of the existentialist metaphysics. We have seen why he thinks that existen-
tialism and phenomenology can be compatible with the realistic tradition. We 
have seen how at the time he wrote The Challenge of Existentialism, he 
considered existentialism to be an appendage of realism. 
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Upon reading Wildls next book, Human Freedom and Social Order, 
we find ourselves in another philosophical world. Gone is his interest in the 
world of change which he explained by such categories as potency and act, 
substance and accident and causality. Instead, we find him dealing with the 
livedpworld of the person and using such categories as self conscious activity, 
global meanings and transcendence. In this book he explicates his philosophy 
of the Lebenswelt and has stepped out of the realistic tradition. In order to 
show how he had one this, we shall first describe what Wild means by a 
philosophy of the Lebenswelt and then take up his new position in ethics. 
We might begin with his statement, "the purpose of philosophy 
is to gain an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids the errors of 
partiality, inaccuracy and superficiality." (64) To understand this, we must 
first know what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and only afterwards, can we hope 
to understand his philosophy of the Lebenswelt. 
Lebenswelt is a German word made popular in philosophic circles 
by the contemporary phenomenologists. It refers to the lived-world of every 
day human existence as opposed to the objective world of the scientist. 
According to Wild, the three most important aspects of its structure are: 
self conscious activity, global meaning and transcendence. (65) 
As he points out self conscious activity has three chief 
(64) John Daniel Wild, Human Freedom and Social Order, Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1959, p. 116. 
(65) Ibid., p. 137. 
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characteristics: each person is the center of his own Lebenswelt; this center 
is constituted by his acts, and in performing these actions the person has a 
cirect awareness of himself. Following Husserl, Wild holds that the Leben-
swelt is always relative to the person who constitutes it by his actions. As 
a result each person has an immediate and certain knowledge of himself as 
subject when he acts, and it is only in his action that he can know himself as 
subject. For when he tries to know himself objectively, he knows only an 
object. Hence, as we shall later see, this structur of the Lebenswelt enables 
the philos9pher to have a knowledge of existential depth by which he can 
escape the superficial attitude which knows not the subject. (66) 
At the same time, "the Lebenswelt is pervaded by global meanings 
which unlike facts, are to some degree subject to individual choice and 
control." (67) These meanings or values-cared-about give order to the lived-
world of both individual and culture. They link together in harmonious 
unity the several parts of the world. Hence, an individual's world is 
ordered by his basic orientation or set of values. For the miser, all things 
will have meaning in that they point toward money. The hypochondriac, on the 
other hand, has a lived-world ordered by health getting. Of course, these 
global meanings are also characteristic of any given culture. For every 
human group has an ultimate value for which it strives, giving meaning to all 
else. 
(66) Ibid., p. 137. (67) Ibid., p. 137. 
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These global meanings have an intimate relation with the 
phenomena of human space and human time which strictly speaking might be 
called structures of the Lebenswelt themselves. Together with the objects 
of his care, each person is involved in a structure of human temporality 
very different from objective time. Hence, time differs from lived-world to 
lived-world. An hour is much longer for the patient in a dentist's chair then 
for the boy fishing. So human space is much different than geometric space. 
It is not just miles that separate the home-sick farmer from his land but 
miles of effort and care. (68) 
It should be mentioned that the lived body has an important role 
in this value structure of skeleton of meaning which links the component parts 
of the Lebenswelt. It is the center of the Lebenswelt or medium of action. 
In the manner of Merleau-Ponty, Wild shows why "care will be reflected in my 
body and its attitudes to surrounding objects." (69) Even a given culture is 
highly influenced by the geographical region in which it is found. "One's 
body is the center of human space, and is surrounded. by objects at hand for 
use." (70) 
But within the Lebenswelt, there is also the experience of 
transcendence. For besides the global meanings which order and pervade the 
world, there are also persons and things which one experiences as being 
completely independent of himself. (71) These persons and things transcend me 
(68) Ibid., p. 139. 
( 7 0) Ibid . , p . 14 0 . 
(69) Ibid., p. 138. 
(71) Ibid., p. 141. 
but not completely. There is also the experience of the holy or mysterious 
which has even a more radical transcendence. both individual and culture has 
this experience. 
We can become aware of the transcendent by self conscious pathways 
or by objective pathways. In the first way, we have but to concentrate "on our 
self-conscious meanings, choices, and feelings." (72) In the second way, we 
note "the checks of objective reason, or confront symbolic phenomena such as 
the holy." (73) By our awareness of the ultimate horizon of mystery, we are 
able to recognize all human worlds as being views of the world that transcends 
them all. Hence, we are aware of the unity of the world. 
Such then is the structure of the human life-world. But before 
considering Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt, perhaps we could better 
understand it by seeing how he contrasts it with the objective world of the 
scientist. In doing this, he uses Plato's allegory of the cave to show that 
the Lebenswelt is both prior to the objective world and even more inclusive. 
Of course, the intellectualist Plato contends that the upper 
world of the intellect is prior to the lived-world of the cave. But to fit 
the facts as he interprets them, Wild inverts the myth. For him, the cave is 
the world of the intellect into which the intellectualist descends from the 
lived-world. Every thinker is first a citizen of the Lebenswelt, and every 
culture first has years _of concrete experience before the period of reflection. 
(72) Ibid., p.141. (73) Ibid., p. 141. 
Hence, the lived-world is prior to and independent of the objective universe. 
(74) 
But also, it is richer and far more inclusive. Science by 
nature can deal only with an abstracted segment of the universe. "The 
universe of science does not encompass and precede the world of life. It is 
rather the concrete world of human existence from which science takes its 
origin, and in which it lives and has its being ... The cave cannot include 
the upper world." (75) 
The Lebenswelt then is structured of self conscious activity, 
global meaning and transcendence. It is prior~to and more inclusive than 
the objective world. With this in mind, we are now prepared to see what 
Wild means by "philosophy of the Lebenswelt." 
To do this, we shall first examine what he calls the three 
criteria of philosophy or wholeness, analytic clarity and existential depth. 
These three criteria, of course, are the opposite of the three errors which 
we saw in his statement quoted earlier, "the purpose of philosophy is to gain 
an understanding of the Lebenswelt which avoids these errors of partiality, 
inaccuracy and superficiality." (76) 
Wholeness or lack of partiality refers to the "global view 
which leaves out no essential structure of this concrete world. In order to 
(74) Ibid., p. 63. (7 5) Ibid . , p. 66. (76) Ibid., p. 116. 
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achieve this, the philosopher must make an effort to get outside of himself, 
and even to arrive at a standpoint which is outside the world." (77) Plato's 
effort is an example of seeking this holoscopic view for he sought to view 
"the world in the light of the good which is beyond our human existence, and 
even beyond all being." (78) 
But also the forte of Aristotle or analytic clarity is necessary 
for a good philosophy of the Lebenswelt. For looking at the world from a 
distance may result in a certain inaccuracy or the second error of philosophy~ 
To prevent this,attention must be devoted to "a careful scrutiny of essential 
parts, one by one, in order to attain a detailed accuracy.'' (79) 
But then, this objective accuracy may cause in the philosopher 
a superficial attitude in which he does not consider the subjective. He may 
lack existential depth in that he views himself and others only as objects and 
not as subjects. Hence, these three: wholeness, analytic clarity and 
existential depth, are the criteria to which a philosophy of the Lebenswelt 
must conform. 
While following these criteria,philosophy has a twofold task, 
namely its primary function of revealing structures of the Lebenswelt and its 
secondary function of sweeping synthetic speculation. Strictly speaking, the 
first is the philosophy of the Lebenswelt and the second is traditional 
realism. Hence, traditional realism is but a secondary phase of the 
(78) Ibid., p. 116. (79) Ibid., p. 117. 
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rhilosophy of the Lebenswelt. In its first task of describing and analyzing 
'the world of concrete experience, philosophy is "concerned with the direct 
evidence of lived experience which is neither exclusively subjective nor ex-
clusively objective, but both together in one." (80) In the light of this 
evidence and using the phenomenological method, its primary task is to 
reveal such structures as lived space, lived time and historicity. In the 
next part, we shall treat this phenomenological method in detail. 
However, in revealing these basic phenomena certain notions will 
~e encountered "whose clarification involves overarching speculation and 
interpretation of the kind traditionally ref erred to as ontology or 
metaphysics." (81) Questions such as those concerning being, meaning, truth, 
and transcendence bring forth the second function of philosophy. The 
experience of such phenomena "enable us to grasp the life world as a whole, 
and call forth a total interpretation." (82) 
In comparing these two functions of philosophy, Wild says that 
the first is "an understanding of freedom and its conditions" and the second 
is the "actual exercise of noetic freedom." (83) I shall treat this special 
problem in the next section. 
Because of its freedom philosophy is not in the ancillary service 
of either science or religion. (84) In fact it "should bring philosophers into 
(80) Ibid., p. 89. 
(84) Ibid., p. 87. 
(81) Ibid., p. 145. (82) Ibid., p. 89. 
close touch with other disciplines ... and should act as a bond linking the 
members of a faculty together in a common task to which all can contribute." 
(85) But on the other hand, the evidence for the speculative function of 
philosophy is "ambiguous and open to divergent interpretations." (86) And 
hence, any attempt to clarify such basic notions as being, truth and value 
"must rest upon faith in a guiding image of some sort that cannot be 
conclusively confirmed by any available evidence." (87) 
This brings us to the third part of this section or the 
relation between Christian faith and the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. We 
have seen what Wild means by the Lebenswelt and the philosophy of it. Now 
we shall examine his definition of Christian philosophy or that "purely human 
discipline striving to take account of the evidence accessible to all, but 
ultimately inspired by the guiding image of Christian faith." (88) Hence, we 
seek to understand two new ideas: what is his concept of Christian Faith? 
and how is it a guiding image for the philosophy of the Lebenswelt? 
Wild defines religion as "the ultimate ·devotion to a transcendent 
mystery directly encountered in the concrete world of existence." (89) It is 
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"a dimension of human existence," and "due to a recognition of transcendence." 
(90) "As concern for an ultimate myster, religion cannot be essentially 
identified with rational theology." (91) Of course, the Christian faith is a 
type of religion and, hence, it also differs from reason. For faith is "the 
(85) 
(88) 
(91) 
Ibid. , p. 145. 
Ibid. , p. viii. 
Ibid . , p. 85. 
(86) 
(89) 
Ibid., p. 89. 
Ibid. , p. 34. 
(87) Ibid., p. 90. 
(90) Ibid. p. 39. 
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ultimate concern for which we are ready to make real sacrifices in ordering our 
existence and reason is the exact understanding of things around us and of our 
changing situation in history." (91) 
But the Christian faith not only differs from reason it also 
differs from myth. For unlike myth it, 
"is addressed to free, self-conscious persons;: .. it is essentially 
involved in human events that occurred in human history, and it 
exists in this history; ... It can meet the serious equestioning of 
rational reflection, and even requires a full development of reason 
for mastery over the animals and the earth; ... It is free and open 
not only to a deepening self-correction of itself, but to a develop-
ment and renewal of all human fields and occupations." (92) 
Now the Christian faith which is neither reason nor myth exists 
in the Lebenswelt. "Its initial acts are not rational hypotheses or 
propositions subject to proof or disproof by objective evidence." (93) 
Instead "the Bible is concerned with human existence in the world of man ... and 
it expresses many insights into the nature of this existence in the ordinary 
language of mankind." (94) Hence, the Bible coupled with the tradition of the 
church, which is also part of the Christian faith, contains historic events. 
At this point, we can begin to see the relation between faith and 
the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. For faith with "Its own kind of evidence, 
and its own distinctive modes of understanding" (95) while not to be confused 
with philosophy, should be related to it. As we have seen the philosophy of 
(91) Ibid. , p. 85. 
(94) Ibid., p. 43. 
(92) Ibid., p. 42. 
(95) Ibid.,_p. 44. 
(93) Ibid., p. 72. 
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the Lebenswelt has two functions, namely the analysis of the concrete lived-
i.,orld and then the speculation concerning the transcendent, which is a 
structure of the lived-world. Now, Wild contends that in the history of 
philosophy this speculation has always been guided by certain images. Plato 
saw "everything in the light of the transcendent idea of the good." (96) 
St. Augustine had "God's living presence ... communicating to him a sense of His 
eternal and timeless truths." (97) Kant and Hegel had their images. But 
Wild argues that the Philosophy of the Lebenswelt should be guided by the 
image of Christian Faith. The Christian philosopher should "openly accept 
the guiding image of his faith in making ultimate clarifications where the 
evidence falls short." (98) 
Wild calls the relation between Christian faith and reason one 
of dialectical tension. In this relation "the organic content of the faith 
is considered not as a set of propositions from which, with the aid of rational 
first principles, philosophic conclusions can be deduced, but rather as a 
guiding image, indirectly indicating ideas, atmospheres, and modes of approach 
that can be worked out in a purely secular way, and tested by secular evidence 
available to all, without jeopardizing the autonomy of the field in question." 
(99) 
Such is Wild's philosophy of the Lebenswelt as presented in 
(96) Ibid., p. 119. 
(99) Ibid., p. 134. 
(97) Ibid., p. 119 (98) Ibid., p. 92. 
Human Freedom and Social Order. Now in that same book, we shall examine his 
consequent ethical position. To do this, it will be necessary to consider the 
subject from the two aspects of individual and social ethics. For in social 
ethics, he still holds the natural law position of self realization ethics. 
However, in individual ethics, this position is rejected for a person centered 
affirmative ethics. 
In taking up this new position, we shall see first why Wild 
rejected a self realization ethics for tle individual and second, we shall 
examine the characteristics of this new ethics. In carrying out the first 
of these tasks, we shall summarize Wild's contrast of the five characteristics 
of self realization ethics with the five of personal ethics. 
The first characteristic of traditional ethics is objective 
calculation. This deliberation about means to an end "presupposes an 
objective understanding of the laws of nature and the natural consequences of 
different kinds of acts, as well as a grasp of the final end which must be 
already understood theoretically before the process can begin." (100) 
However, such a process is not used by a free human person as he makes his 
basic decisions. Personal understanding is not restricted merely to acts 
within a fixed world framework. Instead, the person often uses a type of 
existential reflection which "also makes use of feeling, passion, expressive 
discourse, and every revealing power to which we have access." (101) 
(100) Ibid., p. 156. (101) Ibid., p. 168. 
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Then too, "traditional ethics has been based upon universal 
laws or principles which can be understood in the very same way by different 
minds." (102) For, once a moral end has been determined which is based on a 
true account of human nature and its properties, "rules which must be followed 
by everyman if he is to realize this final end must be clearly formulated." 
(103) But, "personal ethics requires something more than the universal pre-
scriptions of social and moral law." (104) Universal rules only mark the 
lkmits of a person's finite freedom and apply to him negatively. "if he is to 
be given any helpful guidance, a very different kind of ethics is required." 
(105) An ethics which treats the whole person in his concrete situation would 
not focus its attention on the general pattern by ~hich human life can be 
realized but upon the radical exercise of human freedom. 
Self realization ethics is based on a concept of the fixed self 
which as an enduring substance maintains certain essential properties as it 
progresses toward its end. Virtues and vices are considered accidents which 
this substance acquires as it moves from potency to act. But this theory 
leaves no room for essential growth and creativity. (106) "Serious questions 
may be raised as to whether the traditional thing categories do justice to 
existential becoming." (107) If attention is focused on becoming and giving 
rather than resting and possessing there would be categories to better explain 
the phenomena of divine grace and direct love. A person is his history. 
(102) Ibid. p. 159. 
(105) Ibid., p. 171. 
(103) Ibid., p. 155. 
(106) Ibid., p. 161 
(104) Ibid.,p. 171. 
(107) Ibid.,p. 162. 
His acts cannot rightly be understood "as accidents added to a fixed essence." 
(108) 
Of course, it is a fact that the person does have works which 
he can look upon as objects different from himself. If these works conform 
to an objective standard, he is deserving of merit; if they do not he is 
guilty. But objective works, norms and merits are not the only facts. (109) 
There also exists a self revealing activity which proceeds sporadically and 
authentically over long intervals of time. Hence, there should be a deeper 
ethics of my own existence in its full integrity which recognizes these acts 
as well as works. 
From what has been written it can be seen that self realization 
ethics asserts the priority of the past. It looks back to an "already given 
nature, or self, that is to be realized." (110) The general nature of the 
end twoard which this self should strive is also predetermined. "Even grace 
itself must remain within the limits prescribed by this objective nature."(111) 
"All justifiable hope for the future is based on a memory of the past."(112) 
But as the person is his history,so ethics should be historically oriented. 
It should be based on a priority of the future, which is bathed in mystery and 
continually open to further creative understanding. 
Such .. are five reasons which Wild gave for rejecting a natural law 
(108) Ibid., p. 174. 
(lll) Ibid. , p. 164. 
(109) Ibid., p. 164. 
(112) Ibid., p. 178. 
(110) Ibid., p. 164. 
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ethics for the individual. He does not think that a self realization theory 
based upon objective calcualtion, universal law, the self as world center, 
works and the priority of the past fully accounts for the existential facts of 
personal life. In place of this theory, he proposes a new Christian, existen-
tial ethics. As we have seen, it is based instead upon existential thought, 
the existing person, becoming and giving, acts and the priority of the future. 
We shall now examine this new ethics in more detail. 
Perhaps we should begin by pointing out the radical difference of 
this ethics from all traditional theories. In one place, Wild show-s how all 
previous thec·ries have a common pattern of end, means, etc. (113) Then, he 
mentions that this new theory is totally different. In fact, he even writes 
• 
"this is not an ethcis at all, but a way of existing in the world. It does 
not provide us with a method of calculating the success and failure of our 
works, but suggests a way of interpreting our life in the world as a whole 
that arises from the self-revealing of our lived existence. It is concerned 
not so much with abstract laws and principles as with the concrete persons 
for the sake of whom all laws and principles are laid down. It leads us not 
toward self-satisfaction but toward freedom and self-transcendence. It pre-
supposes a realization of the conditions required for personal existence.''(114) 
However, in spite of this description of the difference between 
his theory and traditional ethics, Wild still calls his thought "the 
Christian ethics of love and self-transcendence which is open to the individual 
(113) Ibid., p. 156 (114) Ibid., p. 182 
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person." (115) While his theory cannot be reduced tt> any systematic order, it 
still has the following features: "First, it is a mode of revealing thoug1'.t 
which is acutely self-conscious all the while it is conscious of objects. 
second, it must be aware of the norms it is presupposing. Finally, third, it 
must be concerned with self-world structure as a whole and with those clashes 
between divergent world interpretations which occur in what we now call 
philosophical discourse."(116) 
This new ethics is especially sensitive to the freedom of the 
person. His being-open-to-otherr1ess is that freedom which lies at the root 
of his being. Reason is but an expression of this freedom. In no way does a 
universal determinism destroy personal freedom in this theory. For here a 
person is free to love another directly and even to sacrifice without self 
interest. We might say that the chief motive of this theory is to save the 
fact of human freedom. 
Because of this concern for freedom "It may be said of this 
Christian philosophy, as is said of Kantian ethics, that it is purely formal-
istic and tells us nothing about precisely what we ought to do." (117) Instead 
of a closed sys terr. which tells us what we ought to do, this ethics will be in a 
world of love which is beyond the law. The person will be concerned not so 
much with what to do as with how to do it. This ethics has been lived by 
those who "put persons above the la.w, and have risked their lives for freedom." 
(118) 
(115) Ibid. p. 185. (116) Ibid., p. 176. (117) Ibid., p. 182. 
(118) Ibiri., p. 183. 
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It has the spirit of freedom in fa.ith. (119) 
Such then is the Christian ethics of the Lebenswelt. Its 
principle concern is to promote the freedom of the person. Hence, it differs 
radically from an ethics concerned with perfection of a nature. But still therE 
remains the problem of social ethics and its relation to individual ethics. 
Hence, in the following part of our summary of Wild's new philosophy, we shall 
first consider what he calls "the gap between individual and social action," 
and then, we shall consider his plan for "bridging the gap." 
One has but to look around in order to see the gap between 
individual anci social action. Wild describes the insurmountable chasm which 
yawns between social and individual ethics in the following manner, "personal 
action is open to a radical choice of ends as well as means. It is concerned 
with theindividual in his concrete integrity. It is a dialectical becoming 
which involves the sacrifice of. a past self, as well as the coming of a new 
self to be born, and is centered in something transcendent rather than in a 
structure already formec. It expresses itself in acts where the self is 
totally present rather than in works form which the self can star.cl aside and 
is guided by a forward-looking historicity. Political action, on the other 
hand, follows a calculation 0f means exclusively, not ends. It is centered 
in a fixed constitution already understood and objectified, and is governed 
by abstract principles and laws. It issues in works that can be objectified 
and compared with extrinsic norms, a.nd is governed by a backward looking hope." 
(120) 
(119) Ibid., p. 184. (120) Ibid., p. 208. 
He then mentions how the "Christian ethics of love and sacrifjce, 
expressed in the sermon en the mount ... is still alive in the hearts of western 
individuals, and is still used as a standard for judging the significance of 
ind:i.vidual conciuct." (121) But, on the other hand, he points out that it 
would seem absurd for any political group to love its enemies. If a natjon 
was not anxious for its life, it would be gobbled up in the struggle for 
power. In short, pol.itical ethics is not Christian. There is a gap between 
individual and social ethics. 
The causes of this gap are: (1) "Our personal acts arise from 
the depths of our being and express a way of existing in the world to which 
39 
not only objective thought, but feeling and every revealing power at our 
disposal have made essential contributions." (122) "Political action, on the 
other harLd, arises from a process of deli.berate calculation which is restricted 
to definite intervals of ti.rr,e." (123) (2) "My personal action grows not 
merely from detached observations of myself and others as ojbects but from 
revealing powers that inhabit it. 11 (124) "Political action, on the other hand, 
is governed by a calculation which abstracts frorr. the subjective, and i.s 
directed exclusively toward what can be brought before.the mind as an object." 
(125) (3) "Free personal action must be ultirrately moved by a faith in sorre-
. thing transcending it. Otherwise, the person i.>ill become enslaved to what he 
is, and lose his freedom." (126) "Political action, on the other hand, must be 
(121) 
(124) 
Ibid., p. 208. 
Ibid. , p. 203. 
(122) 
(125) 
Ibid. , p. 202. 
Ibid., p. 204. 
(123) 
(126) 
Ibid., p. 203. 
Ibic1. , p. 206. 
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grounded in a common agreement of many individuals concerning a possible 
common end for the rea.lizaticn of which there is grouncl. for hope." (127) 
(4) "Personal action is clearly aware of the historic past, whj_ch weighs i.t 
down and limits its possibilities. But it is precisely this past which is 
riskec. in a project fer the future. 11 (128) 11Pclitical calculation, on the 
other hand, is based upon a priority of the past. Its ~dm is to realize 
a nature ths.t has a.lreci.dy been agree.cl upon in the form of an accepted 
constHut:'..on. 11 (129) 
In bridging this ga.p, Wild first considers the nature of per sen 
and group. Then, he points cut hew past tl-,eories have tried to solve the 
problem by reducing the person into the group. And finally, he proposes a 
new bridge as viewed by ptenomenology. 
In his treatment of person and group, he looks at group patterns 
fron; the standpoint cf personal freedom. His aim is 11 tc suggest the 
relational interdependence of the individue.l and the group, and the \my in 
which they exist in and for ea.ch other. (13C) He concJ udes that the person 
alone, while existir..g objectively for others, exists in and for himself in a 
concrete world of his own, ordered toward his ultimate concern. All groups 
except the primary I-Thou group are imperfect and potential and exist only for 
the free person. The ultimate meaning of groups, therefore, must be understood 
in terms of the role they play in this personal existence. 
(127) 
(129) 
Ibid. , p. 206. 
Ibid. , p. 207. 
(128) 
(130) 
Ibid.' p. 207. 
Ibid. , p. 207. 
However, individuals do belong to groups and in so far as they do 
they function and think for others. As opposE:d to the dyn2.mic and creative 
life of the individual the world of society is relatively fixed and static. 
It rr.ovef. according to patterns and can be explained causally as a thing. Of 
course, the free persor.. cannot be expl2.inec. in this way but instead is unc.er-
stood by a disciplined, revealing sympathy. (131) Her..ce, persons and groups 
have different traits and properties. They exist and are understood in 
different ways. Neither can exist wittc ... ut tLe other. But because they are 
so radically distinct a gap is grounded jn their very being. 
In t1'.e past philosophers have tried to bridge it by "a.dopting c>.n 
objective point of view and subordinating the individual to the group."(132) 
They have never sharply distinguished individual and soical ethics. They have 
not taken into account the free individual. Instead, they have been content 
to strive for order and peace as the end of ethics. 
However, "the tradition has been wrong in maintaining that the 
end of social justice is a reign of peace and order in which freedom has only 
an abstract right to express itself." (133) For, "the aim of social justice 
is not the abstract possibility of personal freedom but the actual practise 
of it." (134) Hence, "every human institution hsould be judged by the degree 
to which it is open to the actual practise of freedom." (135) 
(131) Ibid., p. 224. 
(134) Ibid., p. 229. 
(132) Ibid., p. 226. 
(135) Ibid., p. 229. 
(133) Ibid., p. 229. 
41 
In the end, Wild means to bridge the gap by using natural law 
social ethics in order ot promote the freedom of the individual. And it is 
precisely this concrete freedom of the individual which has replaced the 
natural law ethics of the individual. For Wild's new ethics (if you can call 
it that) of the individual is not a theory at all. In fact, his theory is 
that you cannot have a theory concerning the ethics of the individual. 
Hence, there are two types of ethics, the one of objective group 
behaviour and the other of subjective freedom. The gap between them can be 
bridged if it is seen that "neither one can exist without the other. Apart 
from realization, freedom cannot even exist. But apart from freedom, self-
realization: becomes a dead repetition of lofty principles that reeks of 
righteousness." (136) 
So society which is encased in natural law principles supports 
an individual freedom which is understood by an entirely different set of 
categories. "Instead of good and evil, we find choice or the failure to 
choose. Instead of right and wrong, we find personal integrity and 
disintegration. Instead of obligation, we find love; instead of justification, 
understatement and humility; instead of justice, forgiveness; and instead 
of self-realization, generosity and sacrifice." (137) 
So much then, for a general summary of the new position of John 
Wild. Now we are ready to forge ahead and seek a deeper penetration of his 
transition by a consideration of detail. 
(136) Ibid., p. 233. (137) Ibid., p. 233. 
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We have already considered in general the various meanings of 
philosophy which Wild has entertained. But now we shall consider in detail 
his latest understanding of philosophy or the philosophy of the Lebenswelt. 
In order not to be repetitious we shall take up f_ive details which we have 
not yet developed. First, we shall consider Wild's recent explanation of the 
merger between phenomenology and existentialism; second, his appreciation of 
William James as phenomenologist and existentialist; third, philosophy as 
therapeautic; fourth, philosophy as human process;and fifth, Wild's contrast 
of philosophy with science and with the humanities. 
In his most recent book, Existence and the World of Freedom, 
Wild sets out to solve the problem of how phenomenology and existentialism 
can be one even though they were started by different men, in different 
places and at different times. Kierkegaard,who is generally recognized as 
the Father of existentialism, lived in Denmark from 1813 to 1858. The 
phenomenological movement began at the turn of the century in Germany with 
Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Today Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and 
Sartre are phenomenological existentialists. Kierkegaard was primarily 
concerned with subjective existence; Husserl with essences and the things 
themselves. How then can one speak of a phenomenological existentialist? 
Was Kierkegaard a phenomenologist? Was Husserl an existentialist? Are 
Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre true followers of both Kierkegaard and 
Husserl? These are questions which occur even to the beginner and Wild, who 
skimmed over them in previous works, now takes them up in the second chapter 
of Existence and the World of Freedom which he entitles Human Existence and 
r 
~enomenology. 
Wild points out a common negative attitude at the origin of 
both existentialism and phenomenology. They each grew out of dissatisfaction 
with a philosophy too far removed from lived experience. Kierkegaard, when 
meditating on Hegel's claim to have reduced the whole of Christian life to 
a system, realized that Christianity is very different when studied from the 
outside as an object than it is when lived from within. He discovered that 
existence c·ould be adequately grasped only from within and other knowledge 
was but observance of essences. Thus, he became concerned with the affective 
knowledge which reveals existence by such feelings as boredom, melancholy, 
anxiety, despair, etc. Thus, Wild writes, 
"By existentialism, we shall mean a new mode of thought, initiated by 
Kierkegaard, which attempts to approach the problem of being by a 
careful study of personal existence as concretely lived. It differs 
from classical realism in denying that such existence can be 
adequately understood by the use of objective categories such as 
thing, time, and space in their traditional senses. It differs from 
modern idealism in holding that the transcendental self is the 
human person in the concrete, and that he and his human world are 
open to disciplined empirical study." (138) 
Brentano and Husserl in criticizing British Empiricism discovered 
the intentional notion of consciousness. They did away with the dichotomy 
between subject and object by discovering that every consciousness is con-
sciousness of something. No longer could the subject be seen as a substance 
enclosed within itself which could contain atomic units of experience. This 
(138) John D. Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p.20-21. 
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notion of intentionality "led Husserl and Heidegger LO their discovery' of the 
human life world, or Lebenswelt, as Husserl called it." (139) 
Thus, existentialism and phenomenology each began with a dis-
satisfaction with abstract, removed-from-life ph~losophy. They were each 
concerned with consciousness and the lived-world which could be known in 
another way than as mere object. But Husserl thought that in order for each 
man to understand his Lebenswelt, there must be a transcendent consciousness 
which could be related to us intentionally. Thus, he posited the transcendenta 
ego which could observe the world as a whole. But this and the bracketing of 
existence in order to know the thing as object has been rejected by Heidegger 
and other phenomenologists. 
The French especially maintain that we can know our self in self 
conscious activity. Thus, 
The living phenomenology of our time is precisely the disciplined 
cultivation of this type of awareness which dwells in our lived 
existence, attending to it, developing it, and clarifying it without 
objectif¥ing it and placing it in an alien frame. This is what 
phenomenology means to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and even Heidegger, 
strongly influenced by the German, transcendental tradition, has 
abandoned the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction.(140) 
He further writes that "the aim of phenomenology is to penetrate through all 
these disguises and concealments (of ordinary language) to the things them-
selves, to uncover them, and to discover what they really mean." (141) 
In describing how the phenomenologist does this work of discovery, 
Wild explains three epoch~s or bracketings which are original with him and 
(139) Ibid., p.3l. (140) Ibid.,p. 34. (141) Ibid., p. 34. 
quite different from the three bracketings of Husserl. First, we must bracket 
our own personal feelings whenever we want to discover the individual or 
cultural event of another. We must go directly to the thing itself without 
being hampered by personal bias. Second, we must move from an individual 
or cultural event to the meaning of this event for the human world. We must 
bracket the individual and examine the meaning of the thing for all men. 
Third, we must even bracket, our opinion about the human world and become 
open to a wider horizon which Wild calls "the world". In this epoche, he 
seeks to get beyond Human meaning to the meaning of a possible transcendent 
other. As we shall see in part four of this section, this is his natural 
theology or way to God. 
Thus, philosophy can be both existential and phenomenological for 
Wild. As we see how he treats existence, freedom, and God this will become 
more clear. But for the moment, we shall briefly see why Wild appreciates 
William James as phenomenologist and existentialist in order to better under-
stand Wild's philosophy. 
Wild now understands "philosophy as a description and interpre-
tation of our existence as it is lived in the concrete, and, therefore, in 
closer touch with the actual philosophic process that is ever proceeding in 
living men." (142) He thinks that James understood philosophy in this way 
also and thus, "in his own way contributed to every one of the major phases 
of existentialist thought that we have mentioned." (143) Wild observes how 
(142) Ibid., p. 28. (143) Ibid., p. 29. 
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James protested also against Hegel and that ivory tower philosophy which is 
separated from concrete and subjective existence. Wild's appreciation of 
James is well put in his own words: 
Constantly on his guard against subjectivism, he was able to describe 
these phenomena and to catch their tone a.nd existential style. Like 
other existential thinkers before and after him, he realized that 
freedom lay deeper in our human being than any mere difference of a 
single faculty, the will; he devoted a lifelong attention to it, and 
in his Psychology identified it basically with the direction of 
mental attention to a single object of Concern. Always skeptical 
of the traditional dualism of mind vs. body, he struggled constantly 
to grasp human behaviour integrally in a way that would do justice to 
both its "mental" as well as its "physical" aspects, and often used 
the word "existence" to grasp them in their being together. 
Perceiving rightly that we cannot get outside our lived existence 
to make up propositions which may agree or disagree with it, he 
worked out many penetrating criticisms of the correspondence theory 
of truth. While he never arrived at a satisfactory formulation of 
his own pragmatic theory, he was right in groping for a more 
primordial kind of truth, which directly reveals our existence in 
the world as we live it, and which is confirmed by its historical 
fruitfulness. Like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and other existential 
philosophers, he recognized the fragility and essential finitude 
of our human existence of any guiding faith. Though in his own 
country, James's ideas have been buried by different trends of 
thought associated with the word "pragmatism," they have been 
deeply studied and cultivated in Europe where, as we shall see, 
they have contributed to the movement now known as phenomenolcigy.(144) 
Having seen the relation between Wild's philosophy and that of 
James, we shall now examine what Wild means by philosophy as therapeutic. 
Consider his statement "Academic philosophy, as we can see in the Platonic 
portrait of Socrates, was first conceived as a therapeutic discipline which 
should try to clarify and to purify this process of primary thinking that 
constantly goes on in every man." (145) In order to understand the therapeutic 
value of philosophy let us begin with the difference between primary thinking 
(144) Ibid., p. 30. (145) Ibid., p. 89. 
and secondary reflection. 
Wild writes, 
Primary thought is spontaneous, always concerned and interested, 
often creative, but uncritical. It is to this type of thought that 
we owe the first original answers that have been given to the 
ambiguities and agonies of life. But when left to itself, without 
criticism, this style of reflection becomes provincial, fanatical, 
and closed to what is universally human. Secondary reflection, on 
the other hand, is reflective and disinterested, self-conscious, 
critical, and open to the universal. It is through this type of 
secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former, that 
fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life;-.world is kept 
open and free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract 
sterile, and uncreative. (146) 
Now notice the words "when it is in touch with the former." 
Wild is scandalized by philosophy or secondary reflection when it separates 
itself from the world of primary thought and seeks to construct a world of 
its own. Philosophy should be a clarification and criticism of the vital 
M>. 
processes of the Lebenswelt. It should not reject the data of lived experience 
as sloppy and confused and if it does it must become artificial and sterile. 
According to Wild the philosopher phenomenologically performs his three 
epoches and thus, reflects on the primary thought of the Lebenswelt. To 
become abstracted from this life world is the philosophical error. The 
philosopher, therefore, must not be a system builder but a describer of life's 
process. 
In fact, following James, Wild even speaks of a "primary 
philosophic process that actually goes on in every living man throughout the 
(146) Ibid., p. 62. 
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waking hours, and as we now know, often through the sleeping hours of his 
daily life." (147) Thus, Wild considers philosophy not only to be on the 
level of secondary reflection but also on the level of primary thought. He 
writes that ther is an "actual philosophic process which is always proceeding 
in the lives of living men." (148) As a result, Philosophy can have "vital 
contact with art, literature, and religion, and with the other living 
institutions of our culture." (149) 
At this point, we might ask how does Wild's philosophy differ 
from art, literature, religion, etc? Since we have an implicit primary 
knowledge in our very activity and since this is made explicit in art, 
literature, etc., why aren't these also philosophy? Wild tries to answer 
this by showing that philosophy is neither sciencenor merely art, literature, 
etc. He writes that philosophy "is not concerned with scientific facts of 
nature but, like history, literature, and the fine arts, with world-facts of 
the Lebenswelt. Unlike these disciplines, however, it is not so much 
concerned with individual acts of freedom, and parti_cular views of the 
world, as with those general limiting conditions under which freedom is 
always exercised, and the structure of the world itself, such as wotld-space, 
world-time, historicity, choice, and death." (150) 
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That philosophy is not science is quite understandable in Wild's 
context and will become even more clear when we consider the philosophic study 
of existence. However, it is now time to consider Wild's concept of freedom 
(147) Ibid., p. 62. 
(150) Ibid., p. 228. 
(148) Ibid., p. 79. (149) Ibid., p. 79. 
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and this consideration will, I think, shed new light on the difference between 
Wild's philosophy and art, literature, etc. 
Wild claims that Philosophy is "the discipline of freedom." (151) 
In order to understand this, we shall begin by se.eing why he considers world 
understanding to be free. At this point, we shall not see in detail what 
Wild means by lived-world since that is to be taken up in the next part. 
However, he thinks that everyone has a lived-world which he has freely 
constituted and which, therefore, "requires a free method of active participa-
tion and interpretation" (152) if it is to be understood. In his own words: 
This method has always been used, at least half-consciously, by the 
best practitioners of the human disciplines, but recently it has 
been further refined and clarified by Husserl and his followers. 
As we have observed, in order to understand any human phenomenon, 
like the magic and myths of a primitive people, a critical decision 
on the part of a living person, or even a past experience of his 
oW-n, the phenomenologist must first free himself fnom his present 
biases and prefer2nces bracketing them, as is said, or putting them 
out of action so far as this is possible. Only by exercising this 
free act of self-negation or epoche, as it is called, do we gain 
access to the phenomenon as it was lived and understood by the agents 
themselves. But this is not the whole story. Afterthis, another 
epoche is necessary. Once again, we must try to free ourselves from 
the limitations of these difference versions by gaining a distance 
from them, and by asking the question: what do they really mean? 
Only in this way can we finally open ourselves to the sense of 
the phenomenon as it really is in the world. We cannot understand 
the free acts of men without ourselves participating in this same 
freedom. 
I believe that this exercise of free understanding is the peculiar 
characteristic of philosophy among the other academic sciences and 
subjects. Xany of them are concerned with the construction of pure 
theories which s_hould correspond with the objective facts. Others, 
more practical and technological, are concerned with the control 
over nature. But philosophy is concerned with the life-world of man 
(152) Ibid. , p. 122. 
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and its free constitution. It is, in a special sense, the discipline 
of freedom. .Making use of the phenomenological method we have just 
described, we see that it attempts to understand this world of man, 
its common structures, its varying modes, and its multiple manifesta-
tion. (153) 
I find it difficult to understand what Wild means here. The 
difficulty begins with his interpretation of the phenomenological method. 
If we experience existence and the lived-world ori the level of primary thought, 
how are we going to keep from distorting them if we seek to understand them 
phenomenologically by means of the three epoches. It seems to me that this 
secondary reflection is the very objectification of the thing which Wild is 
trying to avoid. It seems that the very distance from the thing which the 
second bracketing implies is a failure ID be with the thing itself as it 
really is. 
Secondly, I fail to see how we can understand the free acts of 
other men if we stand back from them. Wild says we must participate in their 
freedom and as he indicates in other places, this must be by means of the 
imagination which we employ with the bracketing. However, it would seem that 
we must become involved with them more completely than by just the imagination. 
At this point, I think a major weakness in Wild's method begins 
to show itself. Because he doesn't really appreciate intersubjectivity, his 
few statements which creep in such as the last sentence of this paragraph,lack 
meaning. He cannot really explain participation in terms of bracketing. He 
hasn't really merged the risky plunge into being with the bracketing and 
(153) Ibid., p. 122-123. 
scientific method of Husserl. 
But getting back to our subject, Wild would maintain that 
philosophy is free because world understanding is free. World understanding 
is free because the life world of man is freely C?nstituted. We give meaning 
to our wor~ds. The philosopher "is especially concerned with the process of 
free understanding by which these world-versions are constituted, and by the 
common conditions such as life-space, human time, history, death,meaning, and 
existence itself, under which this freedom is exercised." (154) But what is 
freedom? 
Wild associates the words spontaneous, active and indeterminate 
with freedom. A free act must be spontaneous or "independent and self 
originating within the agent." (155) It must not be merely passive and 
52 
receptive. If I am pushed about, restricted or obsessed, I am to that degree 
not free. Also, freedom is indeterminant. There must be alternatives. If I 
can do only one thing then I am not free. Wild defines freedom as an active-
being-open-to-what-is-other. 
Wild claims that philosophy is the discipline of freedom and 
singles out three of its characteristics in order to show how each is free. 
First, philosophy is free because it is speculative and systematic. In 
working out his own version of the world the philsoopher must keep himself 
free from assumptions and presuppositions. To exist unwittingly in the world 
frame of another is to be a mental slave. Philosophy in its speculative 
(154) Ibid., p. 124. (155) Ibid., p. 127. 
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aspect is also free because it is the guardian of Freedom and independence. 
"Philosophy is not an objective science. It is rather the guardian of human 
integrity and independence. When understood in this way, the history of 
philosophy appears neither as a mere chaos of conflicting views nor as a 
processio~ of unrivaled dogmatisms. It is rather a perpetual search for 
world-understanding, and that personal freedom of mind on which such under-
standing depends." (156) 
Next, philosophy should be free in its linguistic and logical 
functions. The philosopher should be open to the worlds of others and thus, 
the importance of public discourse and communication. "The existence of a 
free society depends on communication in depth by free men. The difficulties 
here are basically of a philosophical order. Of all the different academic 
disciplines, philosophy is in the most favorable position to give us aid. 
Once again these facts suggest that philosophy is the discipline of 
freedom." (157) 
Philosophy is also free in its critical function. Hen like 
Socrates and Kant question every supposition and every manifestation of 
dogmatism in order to keep philosophy open and free. Philosophy "represents 
neither life, nor truth, nor goodness, nor beauty; nothing, indeed, but the 
spfrit of freedom on earth, the self-transcendence of man.'' (158) Whenever 
philosophy claims to have arrived at an absolute, unchangeable truth or system 
it becomes scandalous. Its goal is to free men for progressive understanding. 
(156) Ibid., p. 134. (157) Ibid., p. 136. (158) Ibid., p. 138. 
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Philosophy is distinguished from the other arts and sciences 
because of its special relation to freedom. They all have a more confined 
goal and are concerned with something more narrow than the freedom of man. 
Philosophy seeks spontaneously, actively and indeterminantely to grasp the 
whole of the life-world and not merely a fragment of it. 
From this it is evident that Wild does not reduce freedom to a 
characteristic of the will. It is also a characteristic of understanding. 
Freedom does not depend on understanding alone but freedom is the very source 
of understanding. Man can creatively construct his life world because he is 
free. Because man is open to the other, he can go beyond himself. He is open 
not only to facts but also to meaning. The Academy has as its duty to protect 
this freedom of man. It should defend and result in a fuller life world. In 
its therapeutic function it purifies primary understanding and fress one from 
its suppositions. Thus, philosophy freely constitutes and maintains the life 
world. But now to better understand this free philosophy, let us examine the 
world it knows or the existence it creates. 
Wild is interested in existence in the Kierkegaardian sense of 
"subjective" lived experience. Hence, it cannot be known objectively from 
without but only from within. He approaches the problem of being by a study 
of personal existence as concretely lived. This person is always the center 
of a world which is permeated by care, human space, human time and other 
structures which Wild thinks can be known philosophically. But before we 
consider these structures individually, we shall first study what he means by 
lived-world, world fact, world meaning and world truth. 
He develops his idea of the lived-world by contrasting it with 
the objective or scientific world. He thinks the lived-world has been rejected 
as an object of philosophic study since the time of plato who considered it to 
be the shadow world. Until the ~esent day, Wild thinks that philosophy has 
been scie~tific by which he means that philosophers have abstracted from the 
whole of experience in order to understand a certain objective segment. These 
scientific philosophers have rejected the subjective and reduced all being to 
an object. But the lived-world, which even every scientist lives in, is not a 
things, it is "an ultimate horizon within which all such objects and the 
individual person himself are actually understood in the 'natural attiude' of 
everyday life." (159) 
This 'natural attitude' includes all kinds of primary knowing 
such as feeling, thought, imagination and any natural power. The primary 
aspect of this attitude is the care which constitutes the order of the world. 
This pen is for writing; that shovel for digging. If an object is for some-
thing, it is part of the lived-world. In order to better understand this 
lived-world, we shall follow Wild in his distinction between scientific facts 
and world facts. 
World facts are concrete, independent of any special mode of 
approach and subjectively experienced from within. Scientific facts on the 
other hand, are abstract, partially dependent on special modes of observation 
and purely objective. This, of course, is in keeping with Wild's distinction 
(159) Ibid., p. 41 
r 
between primary knowledge and secondary reflection. · World facts are known by 
primary knowledge; scientific facts by secondary reflection. Wild calls the 
first type of facts world facts because they appear on the unlimited horizon 
of the world. Science has more restricted horizon which in its quest for 
objectivit:;y deprives world facts of their ambiguity and openness. It doesn't 
see them as stretched out in time but it is content with broken off segments. 
The facts of science are not temporal and existential. 
But there are more than world facts; there are world meanings. 
56 
By a fact Wild refers to "any bit of evidence that is forced upon our atten-
tion, whether we will or not. .. They are disparate and disorganized." (160) 
Meaning,on the other hand, is "the result of a unique interchange between man 
and the independent things and persons around him." (161) By this understand-
ing of meaning, Wild rejects both the traditional realistic and idealistic 
understanding of meaning. Meaning does not exist independently in nature to 
be received by an empty and passive mind nor is it created do nova py the 
human mind. 
As with facts, there are two kinds of meanings: the world and 
the scientific. Scientific meanings are again abstract and partial rather than 
global. They are causal and allow for predictability. But world meaning or 
interpretation does not aim at prediction and causal control; it seeks merely 
to understand. 
This world understanding begins with world facts in their 
(160) Ibid., p. 66. (161) Ibid., p. 69. 
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immediacy, but it goes beyond them. According to Wild, it is achieved by the 
second epoche which we previously mentioned. Here the phenomenologist seeks 
to clarify "those structures like .::time, history, freedom, death, and world 
itself, which seem to belong necessarily to human existence, and thus, to make 
any human world version possible." (162) World meanings are called forth in 
our daily struggle with alien forces "by a creative factor in man, which takes 
account of the facts and yet goes on beyond them." (163) Meanings are always 
open to further questioning, clarification, deepening and reinterpretation. 
Now, together with world fact and world meaning, there is also 
world truth. Wild thinks that a certain understanding of the facts can be 
called true if it will hold up in time, if it is fruitful, if it calls forth 
authentic existence in history. Thus, the criterion for world truth is not 
correspondence as it is for objective truth but rather authenticity. World 
truth depends on how we hold the patterns of world meaning and how we live 
them through. 
Thus, the existence which Wild is interested in as a philosopher 
has the three levels of world fact, world meaning and world truth. But, 
this type of existence cannot be spoken of as the object of his philosophy. 
For it is precisely not an objective existence. Wild is interested in an 
unobjectified existence, in existence as it is lived, rather than as it is 
studied by the scientist. In order to see how he approachs this unobjectified 
existence, we shall single out the theme of anxiety from that list which 
(162) Ibid., p. 73. (163) Ibid., p. 73. 
which includes: world, body, situationality, guilt, death, etc. 
Following Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Wild points out what 
anxiety is by contrasting it with fear. I am afraid of a definite thing 
for a definite reason. But when the anxious person is questioned what he is 
anxious about, he answers 'nothing' and he is right. One is anxious about 
no-thing but about the whole of his existence in the world. It reveals the 
difference between oneself as a function and as a person. 
However, anxiety is a state which can be evaded. One can replace 
his anxiety by derived forms of fear. In short, he can flee his personal 
existence. He can escape from that which threatens the whole of his being-to-
the-end (in Heidegger's words) by deciding to be sensible and to go about his 
business. If he, thus, becomes a 'business man' rather than a person, he 
loses the anxiety and also the freedom to which anxiety is the gateway. 
Wild doesn't develop in detail the relation between anxiety 
and freedom but seems to expect one to go to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. In 
fact, he merely hints at the meaning of all the structures of the lived-world. 
In fact, this regard he never goes beyond the summary work that he did in 
The Challenge of Existentialism. 
However, he has worked out a type of existential proof for the 
existence of God based upon the dialectical thension between freedom and 
order, which we should now examine in order to further understand the basic 
notions of his philosophy. We shall examine this proof under three aspects: 
first, we shall see that iit is the only type of proof which Wild thinks will 
r 
arrive at a personal God. Second, we shall see that Wild means by existential 
proof. Third, we shall state his proof. 
Before beginning his proof, Wild comments on the distinction of 
Pascal between the God of the Philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob. He agrees with Pascal that these two Gods are not the same. He states 
specifically that the approach to God of the Cartesians and the Idealists is 
irrelevant and reductionistic. By this, he means that because of their 
objective, rationalistic, reasoning process, they do not really prove the 
existence of the real personal God of the religious man. They reduce this 
personal God to a thing. It seems that he ~ould also level this critique 
against Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas. However, in the next section when 
we take up his critique of Thomism, we shall consider this in detail. But 
for now let it suffice to say that Wild doesn't think that previous philosophic 
arguements for the existence of God are valid because they reduce God to a 
thing and, therefore, do not really reach Him. 
However, Wild thinks that the task of proving God's existence is 
not hopeless for the philosophers. He thinks that the phenomenological 
existentialist is able to do this. This is so because his method is not 
objectively rationalistic and reductive in the traditional manner. But what 
is this method? What is an existential proof? 
Wild states that this kind of argument has two parts. First, 
the philosopher states and describes as accurately as he can certain facts 
which are familiar in some degree to almost all men. Second, he reflects on 
these facts and sees that they point to what he is,proving. In his own words, 
The following argument will proceed in this manner. It will start 
with certain lived experiences, or world facts, as we have called 
them, with which we are all familiar. It will then attempt to 
clarify the meaning of these facts. This is what is meant by an 
existential argument. (164) 
The world fact with which Wild begins is "the restlessness of our 
existence-in-the-world, which drives us beyond any fixed form or pattern and 
works in us as a first, creative ferment in our human history." (165) 
Wild describes the history of philosophy as an example of this restlessness. 
There is a quest for meaning which works at the center of human history. This 
quest results in a theory which man hopes will enable him to interpret all the 
facts. But as soon as the order of the theory is established other facts are 
seen which are unexplained and revolution sets in. Because of his openness to 
these other facts men is in search of a new system. Thus, man's history is 
marked by a dialectic between freedom and order. 
The next fact which he considers is one that has been learned 
from this hisotry of creative disillusionment. 
It has been discovered that forms of undiluted tyranny and those of 
anarchic freedom are unworkable. Only those patterns which combine 
a maximum of freedom together with a maximum of order seem to be 
authentically human. But these words express an ideal that can be 
only remotely approximated, and no institutional order that has ever 
been, or ever will be actually established, seems likely to escape 
from the force of creative criticism. (166) 
(164) Ibid., p. 206. (165) Ibid., p. 206. (166) Ibid., p. 207. 
Stating this in another way, he writes,· 
Pure freedom, after negating every fixed pattern, becomes uncreative, 
and wastes itself away. Unity, on the other hand, as soon as it is 
established and freed from tension, becomes rigid and dies. Freedom 
needs order, and unity needs freedom, but in the imperfect modes 
which we can achieve, neither can bear the other. And yet as long as 
we remain human, we are lured toward a perfect order and a perfect 
fri;edom which would somehow coincide. (167) 
Next, Wild asks himself what is the ultimate sense of this 
restless tension between freedom and unity. In answer to this question, 
he ·writes that ''that being-open-to-otherness whi.ch lies at the heart of 
this dialectic leads toward what is wholly other--radically transcendent ... 
It is moving from the passive, uncreative, determinate, and multiple toward 
an infinite which is active, creative, indeterminate, and purely one."(168) 
In concluding, he writes, 
The conclusion of the argument is this: the free action which lies 
at the heart of cultural, and even more of individual history, points 
to a transcendent unity, which is the ultimate, creative source of 
meaning and being, and of the unity of the world. (169 
Wild calls this an argument of motion rather than notion. In 
order to be convinced by it, one must experience it. He thinks that many 
men do and he cites examples of it such as religious conversion, or the 
appreciation of a new and wider philosophic viewpoint. 
In concluding this section, I would remark that this arguw.ent 
of Wilds seems to be colored with a certain optimism. It seems that he is 
arguing from a felt need to a fact. He seems to say that we have a need for 
(167) Ibid., p. 207-208. (168) Ibid., p. 209. (169) Ibid., p. 209. 
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the transcendent and infinite other ancI, therefore, it is. Maybe there wouldn' 
even by any meaning tmless this ultimate ground of meci.ning existed. But Wild 
seems to assume that things do have meaning. I would agree with him in this. 
But, I doubt if Sartre would. This argument merely reaffirms the conviction 
of the believer in meaning. 
Having examined Wild's realism and his Lebenswelt philosophy, we 
shell now consider the relation between these two positions by observing how 
he criticizes realism as a Lebenswelt philesoph~r. In order to do this, we 
shall sE;e how he criticizes St. Thomas and two contemporary Thomists. For this 
information, we shall use his essay, Christian Rationalism. We shall divide 
his criticism of St. Thomas into four parts concerning knowledge, being, 
God and man. 
Wild begins his essay by writing that St. Thomas' purpose was to 
synthesize Greek philosophy and Christian faith. Re describes how these two 
traditions idffered and how they converged in St. Thomas. St. Augustine was 
the chief representative of Christian theology. In many ways, he was an 
existentialist. He held that faith,not reason,was the foundation of 
Christianity. Religion was not to be understood as a theory but as a way 
of life. However, when the philosophical texts of the Greeks and Arabians 
were translated into Lati.r: the scholars of Western Europe saw a new vision. 
"This opened their minds_ to the possibility of a purely rational exploration 
of the realm of nature, unfettered by any dogmas of faith, and inaugurated 
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a long and bitter struggle between rational science and faith.'' (170) Wild 
goes on to argue that St. Thomas was deeply influenced by the Greek scientific 
spirit and as a result "his great synthesis was weighted heavily on the 
Aristotelian side and there were few Augustinians, familiar with his works, 
who failed· to see that it was inspired by Athens rather than by Je.rusalem."(171: 
St. Thomas' procedure was guided froil' beginning to end by the 
Aristotelian concept of science. Wild writes that, 
"Aquinas follows Aristotle in defending the notion of an absolutely 
empty reason which can assimilate. the natures of all things and 
apprehend the whole cosmic order from a detached point of view 
outside the world."(172) 
Of course, Wild puts special emphasis on the detachment of science. Since 
it disregards the knowledge of involvement because it considers it to be 
unscientific, Wild is opposed to the scientific procedure of St. Thomas. 
He thinks, as we have seen, that man has a type of knowledge as a result of 
his being involved in the world that can be philosophic even though it isn't 
scientific. As a result of this knowledge of involvement, the Lebenswelt 
philosopher thinks that he alone can justly treat human existence, freedom, 
time, etc. 
Thus, Wild argues that this "pure, theoretical knowledge" (173) 
of St. Thomas receives only the formal structures of things. It is incapable 
of grasping existence. Wild writes, St. Thomas' ' 1approach is basically 
(170) WilliaU? Earle, James H. Edie and John Wild, Christianity and Existen-
tial ism; Evanston: Northwestern University Press,1963. p. 42. 
(171) Ibid., p. 44. (172) Ibid., p. 45. (173) Ibid.,p.45. 
_formalistic, and he starts with a definition, not a description.'' (17~) 
t'. ~For this reason, 
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"his major w--ri.tings la.ck ar.y vital flavor of concrete existence and 
are remote from the facts of hi.story. In his theology, it is the 
Platonism of Augustine rather than his biblical thinking that he 
follows. In spite of many alternations and adaptations in a 
Christian direction, his system is a great expression of Greek 
rationalism." (175) 
Also Wild thinks that this scientific knowledge of St. Thomas is 
passive. It only 
"Absorbs the forms of things as they already are and must 
then expresses them in the form of objective judgments. 
functioning properly, it is never active in the sense of 
original or creative." (176) 
Wild also thinks that this 
be, and 
When 
being 
"theoretical assimilation even plays an essential role in what 
Aristotle called practical reason, for it determines the whole 
world frame in which the action is to take place, and sets the end. 
We choose and deliberate only about the means, never justifiably 
about the natural end." (177) 
So Wild levels the charges of formalism and rationalism against 
64 
~Thomas' scientific approach to philosophy. He thinks that Thomas has restrict-
1 ed himself to a merely passive type of knowledge which will not adequately 
!,treat the lived-world and the life of faith. He thinks that Thomas in some 
iway hinders practical reason by restricting it with theoretical reason. Thus, 
L . h. . k . Th I h. Of w' ld · 11 1 ;1 ne is 1nt1ng at a wea ness in omas et ics. course, 1 wi a so 
II 
jcriticize his theories of being, God and man because they are based on this 
(174) Ibid., p. 50. 
'(176) Ibid., p. 45. 
(175) Ibid., p. 51. 
(177) Ibid., p. 45. 
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:!faulty concept of philoso;i:-.:::..c :mowledge. 
i 
i j In a manner which reminds one of Heidegger's theme concerning 
ri 
lthe forgetfullness of being, Wild summarizes in a short paragraphy all that 
. 
he thinks St. Thomas had to say about being and concludes, 
"Aside from this,Aquinas has little to say about being, though he 
pays it high compliments. He concieves of it as an objective 
presence before the mind or as the possiblity of such a presence. 
That which cannot be brought before the mind or the senses in this 
way does not exist. 11 (178) 
Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas has objectified being. Thomas says that it is 
the first and widest of all concepts and that it cannot be defined. It is a 
! concept which even includes God by analogy. 11 In.:the case of finite entities, 
it is the act which brings them out of the imperfect state of potency and 
places them among things." (179) But to Wild this type of meditation on being 
is sterile. It is blind to the being of the lived-world. St. Thomas' 
philosophical and theological writings "are highly impersonal, objective, 
and abstract and convey little sense of passion, or, indeed, of any human 
b 
existential feeling." (180) In short, Wild thinks that, 
"Aquinas says that being is very important, and he ev.en implies in 
certain statements that it is more important than essence (whatness). 
But they are hard to reconcile with his apparently unqualified 
acceptance of Aristotelian rationalism and formalism. 11 (181) 
Wild also criticizes St. Thomas' proofs for the existence of God 
and his theory concerning the attributes of God. He begins with a few remarks 
concerning Thomas' concept of the world. Since these are so individual, I 
shall quote them in full. 
I (178) 
i 
(181) 
Ibid • , p . 4 6 . 
Ibid., p. 49. 
(179) Ibid. , p. 45. (180) Ibid. , p. 48. 
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"Aquinas, like Aristotle, was never able to understand how any finite ~.· 
being, even a living organism, can move itself. Hence, every finite ~ 
motion and every finite act which realizes a potentiality must have I 
an external cause that is already in act. Otherwise, something would ~ 
happen without a reason, the cosmos would be reduced to chaos, and ~ 
ultimately the law of contradiction would be violated. These rules ~ 
of objective human thinking are regarded by Aquinas as ontological ~ 
principles which actually govern all the events of nature and history. ' 
This consistent application of the Aristotelian causal principle leads. 
to a strangely static conception of a universe heavily guarded and 
hemmed in by formal chains. Nothing can be brought into existence 
unless there is a definite essence already there in potency and ready 
to receive it. And even while it exists, it cannot move unless there 
are causes already thereto bring it into act. In this strictly 
ordered cosmos, existence seems to be dealt out grudgingly and only 
under carefully restricted conditions." (182) 
Then, he writes, 
"God is the single exception. 
In fact, He must necessarily 
of being." (183) 
He alone can act without restriction. 
do so, for His essence is the pure act 
Next, Wild states that according to Thomas the existence of God 
"can be syllogistically demonstrated.: (184) After very briefly stating the 
•nature of such demonstration, Wild writes, 
"But is the act of existing always predetermined by a prior whatness? 
How do we know that the universe is rational? Must it correspond 
exactly to our habits of objective, logical reflection? Except for 
references to the authority of the philosopher, Aquinas gives us no 
answer to these questions. As Pascal noted, they make no contact 
with the intuitive feeling of our lived existence and are, therefore, 
singularly lacking in persuasive power." (185) I 
i; Only in the light of this last statement, can I understand some 
lof the statements which Wild just made above. Perhaps, his point is that 
! I objective reasoning and demonstration is not personally moving. Perhaps, he 
I 
1-(-18_2_)-Ib_i_· d-.-,-p'-. 4-6-.-(-1_8_3_) _I_b_i-d. ,-p-. 4-. 7-.--(1_8_4_)_I_b_i_d_. -, p-.-4-7-. -(-l-85_)_I_b-id-.-p-. -4 7---4-8-. -Ii.. 
) 
,is saying there is another type of ontology which describes the world we know 
·'in experience more aptly. Perhaps he is merely trying to emphasize in a 
:, 
;I 
:i phetorical way that there is another philosophical way of knowing the 
i 
!existence of God which is more convincing. 
I ~ 
! Wild is also critical concerning of St. Thomas' notion of the ~ 
!divine attributes. First, he thinks that Thomas' notion of analogy leads to 
!anthropomorphism and a diluting of divine transcendence. Concerning Thomas' 
itheory, he asks, "is man made in the image of this divinity, or is it not 
; 
•': 
jrather true, as Feuerbach suggested, that God is a great construction made in 
j 
:! ~he image of man?" (186) Wild thinks that Tho~nas' lack of respect on the 
ii 
!philosophic level for God's transcendence is again the result of Greek 
~influence. After naming the various attributes which Thomas deduces from the 
'conclusion of his causal arguments Wild writes, 
"He is even referred to in strictly Aristotelian terms as the unmoved 
mover. This Greek. emphasis on immobile changelessness is hard to 
reconcile with the living God of Christian faith, and the cautious 
hemming-in of existential activity by essences and causes, as we 
have noted, seems out of key with the Christian conceptions of 
generosity and love." (187) 
Wild writes Aquinas', 
"God does not speak to us from remote heights far beyond our 
knowledge. He does not lure us on to new thoughts and creative 
endeavor. He seems to think very much like Plato and Aristotle, 
and instead of urging us to break our chains and to go on our way, 
he seems rather to tighten them and to admonish us to look back 
and stay as we were." (188) 
Thus, Wild thinks that Thomas' philosophy does not allow him to 
experience. Because of his scientific 
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·spp::-oach Thomas could not treat of a :_:iersonal God. Wild WTites that, "While 
: 
:: Aquinas expressed a deep sense of mystery in his famous hymns and in cryptic 
~ 
" 
'.j statements about his life work, this is not evident in his philosophical and 
~ « ! theological WTitings." (189) 
' i 
I 
~ 
I! theory 
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Of course, this Greek rationalism also had an effect on Thomas' 
of man. It allowed Thomas to treat of man only as a thing. Wild WTites 
"Thus, in his treatise on :rt2n ia the S-Jm;:ia Theologiae, he pays little 
or no attention to human existence in the world and ma~es little 
effort to catc~ the feeiing and atmosphere of this existence. As 
he sees it, this is too confused and variable, and he follows his 
master, Aristotle, in holding that there is no science of the 
individual. His approach is basically formalistic, and he starts 
with a definition, not a description." (190) 
! ~Thus, again Wild makes the same basic criticism. Thomas would not allow 
!himself as a philosopher to use affective knowledge of the Lebenswelt and I thus, his treatment of man was inad~quate. Wild writes that for Thomas, "Man 
!I is not a world. He is rather a material substance, or thing, in the world 
~ ~among othEr things, which is living, animal, and finally rational." (191) 
~ 
' ~ 
~ 
l I 
u 
:l 
I 
Wild thinks Thomas too scientific. He never really meets Thomas. 
After making these criticisms, Wild is quick to urge that he 
1greatly respects the penetrating and wide-ranging mind of Aquinas. He tells 
I 
!how he admires his "shrewd capacity for making fine distinctions with some 
! 
I· 
'basis in observation." (192) But then, he reminds us that we should not 
i I (189) i (192) 
I 
Ibid., p. 48. 
Ibid. , i p. 51. 
(190) Ibid., p. 49. (191) Ibid., p. 50. 
" i'follow Aquinas in his mistakes and with this launches an attack upon I :, 
p:faritain 
I 
'I 
i 
,! 
!referred 
cl 
ishow what 
!Existence 
I authentic 
and Gibson whom he thinks have done this. 
Wild begins by pointing out how Gilson and Maritain have 
to Thomism as "the only authentic existentialism." In order to 
they mean by this, he gives a short review of Maritain's book 
and the Existent. Here Maritain states that Thomism is "the only 
existentialism" because of "'the primacy which authentic Thomism 
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accords to existence and to the intuition of existential being' over essence an-
because of the many defects he finds in contemporary existentialism." (193) 
! 
lwild describes the two most basic charges which ~aritain brings against 
' !existentialism, namely, "an exclusive concern with the subjective and a 
i 
!rebellion against the light of reason." (194) Then, Wild points out that 
IMaritain opposes the existentialist ethics because "'by repudiating 
lspeculation in favor of action ... it becomes voluntaristic', that is, it 
I 
i ~encourages a blind action with no concern for its natural end." (195) Also 
i 
' !Maritain thinks that "the moral teaching of existentialism is "'an absurd 
,, abyss of pure and formless liberty." (196) 
Next, Wild refutes Maritains' refutation of existentialism. He I 
1 
begins 
I 
by pointing out Maritain has misunderstood the term 'existence' as the 
. existentialists are using it. Maritain distinguishes essence and existence 
uand then in opposition to certain essentialists emphasizes existence. But the 
~ (193) lb 'd 52 l • p. . (194) Ibid., p. 54. (195) Ibid., p. 54. 
(196) Ibid. p. 55. 
exist.en·cia.2.ists do not "Gse exis-:e::.ce i~1 -chis 1.11a.y at c..:l. In fact, they even 
. cut 
J 
below the very distinction between essence and exis·cence . \..'hen they use 
" ;the term 'existence' they refer to a human way of being which is temporal and 
i1 
~ !ecstatic. 
l 1 
' ~ 
I 
"Maritain has not seen that it is the traditional 
objective presence before the mind that is being 
issue is far more basic than be believes." (197) 
concept of being as 
questioned. The 
iso according to Wild, Thomism is not "the only authentic existentialism". 
i 
!In fact, it is not an existentialism at all. 
I 
Maritain has misused the term. 
! In answer to l1aritain' s objection that existentialism is a 
!subjectivist philosophy Wild points out that according to the examination of 
~ 
lthe phenomenologists there is no such thing as a sabjective objective dichotomy] 
;on the contrary "human existence is intentional or relational in character, I. 
nstretched out spatially and temporally into a moving field of care." (198) i -~ 
! 
i 
i 
! 
~ 
i 
I 
! i 
I 
' ~ 
~ ~ 
:I 
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"I am where my attention is riveted, where my care is taking me, in 
some region of the human world. I am in this world not objectively, 
as a paper is in the drawer or as a drop of water is in a glass. I 
am in this world as a field of care, as say that a young doctor is in 
medicine or that a boy is in love. 
"I am not first locked up in a private subjectivity from which I emerge 
by special process of "knowledge" which take me out of myself. This 
subjectivist picture, which M. Maritain shares with the central 
tradition of Western thought, has led only to absurd and unanswerable 
questions as to whether there is any external world at all. The 
existential thinkers have not merely rejected this false construction; 
they have lucidly described many phases of our relational existence 
in the light of constraining evidence. They have shown that man is 
stretched out into a world from which, as long as he exists, he can 
never be separated. Theoretical knowing and speaking presuppose this 
world. They are themselves special ways of being in the world. 
" ... Not only is existential philosophy not subjectivist; it has now 
gone further in working out a radically non-subjectivist view of human . 
I !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;; 
1, ~ 
n(l97) Ibid.,'p. 57. (198) Ibid., p. 57. ~.: 
I ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
I 
I 
I 
existence in the world than all those traditional forms of 
objectivism which have a kernel of subjectivism at their very 
root." (199) 
Concerning Maritain:::s charge that existentialism is a rebellion 
!against the light of reason Wild shows how he thinks "that this world of our 
! 
. llived existence is an 'unknowable abyss' and that the disciplined attempt to 
' 
jexplore it by the so-called methods of phenomenology leads to a 'destruction 
i 
71, 
!of the intellect!" (200) Then Wild indicates that such a statement of Maritain 
~ 
;,merely shows the weakness of his philosophical position. The existentialists 
I ~have shown that subjective existence can be explored. They have done it. 
I 
~ 
I Maritain thinks that existentialism is irrational because of the ,, I iway in which he defines reason. For him it is the "examination and analysis 
~of objects that can be brought before the mind and senses."(201) However, I 
~ J 
rwild thinks that reason is "Discovering and bringing into the light the truth - i 
!of things and existents, wherever and however they are." (202) Consequently, 
! 
!"the disciplined exploration of the life-world, which has only recently begun, 
11' an eminently rational enterprise." (203) 
! 
Concerning Maritain's objections to existentialist ethics, Wild 
begins by saying that as a result of certain findings of clinical psychology 
the existentialists oppose the traditional distinction between intellect and 
•
1will. Then, he goes on to argue that "freedom is by no means restricted to a 
single faculty, the will." (204) The history of philosophy itself shows that 
(199) Ibid., p. 58-59. (200) Ibid., p. 60. (201) Ibid., p. 61. 
Ibid. , p. 62. (203) Ibid. p. 63. (204) Ibid., p. 63. 
j 
lman has a certain freedom of mind "which enables :nm to :.:-ebel against 
ij 
jcrystallized idealogies and to work out a way of life and understanding for 
ij 
!himself, responsibly."(205) Even the lived-world is pervaded with freedom 
land just because, 
"existential thinking has found no evidence sutficient to support the 
claim that there are objective norms and principles valid for all 
mankind, irrespective of the different histories and circumstances 
of different groups,J .. there is no reason to say that it advocates 
'a pure and formless liberty.'"(206) 
~The existentialist idea of freedom does imply responsibility in a definite way. 
i· 
"Value is to be found in existing. Therefore, we can say that any 
personal existence that evades or suppresses the lasting limits and 
conditions of this existence is not truly human or authentic."(207) 
In conclusions Wild writes, 
"This must suffice as a brief indication of the kind of answer 
that might be given, in a fuller discussion,to the moral charges 
made by M. Maritain against existential philosophy." (208) 
Thus, we have seen how Wild attacks the old position which he 
once defended. Even as late as his second phase of realism when he wrote 
The Challenge of Existentialism he argued much like Maritain with his 
distinction between essence and existence, essentialism and existentialism. 
As a result of our examination of his objections to realism, we can see how 
the two periods of Wild's career differ. 
In ending we must say a word about Wild's critique of Thomism. 
St. Thomas clearly saw the difference between what Wild calls Lebenswelt 
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
1 
(205) Ibid. p. 63. (206) Ibid., p. 63 (207) Ibid., p. 63. 
(208) Ibid. p. 62. 
i·, .. "" d 1 ' T" h ( .mowJ..eage an rational know eage. Bt:.t ,,or:ias neve:c thought t at the former 
1; 
\ 
'!could be philosophical. But his reason for this was not just a simple 
~ 
~acceptance of Greek rationalism. In fact, as Thomas clearly points out in 
:J 
ri 
!his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius he himself disagrees with the 
l jvery rationalism of the Greeks which Wild accuses him of. He tries to go 
~ 
lbeyond them and discover a way of exploring existence philosophically. (209) 
~ I 
''Wild does not appreciate this. 
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
' ! (209) Ibid. 
i 
~ 
i ~ I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
BIBLICGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
1) George Berkley; A Study of His Life and Philosophy, 
New York: Russell and Russell, 1962. 
2) Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948. 
3) Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
4) Plato's Theory of Man; An Introduction to the Realistic 
Philosophy of Cul·:~:..:.re, Ne.w Yo:ck: Octagon Books, AL4. 
5) The Challenge of Existentialism, Bloomington: 
Indiana U. Press., 1959. 
6) Human Freedom and Social Orde.r; An Essay in Christian 
Philosophy, Durha.~, ~.C.: Duke University Press, 1959. 
7) Existence and the World of Freedom, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1963. 
REVIEWS ON HIS BOOKS 
Journal of Philosophy 
1) 1937, George Berkeley, SPL, p.19. 
2) 
3) 
4) 
1946, 
1950, 
1955, 
Plato's Theory of Man, D.S. Mackay, 688-697. 
Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, 
E.A.M., 717-719. 
Plato's Modern Enemies and the 
Theory of Natural Law, Philip Merlen, 
349-356. 
74 
5) 1956, The Return to Reason, W. Donald Oliver, 457-469. 
Modern Scl-100 lman 
1) 46, 47, 
2) 48, 49, 
3) 54, 55, 
New Scholasticism 
1) 1949, 
2) 1955, 
3) 1957, 
4) 1961, 
Plato's Theory of Man, R.J. henle, p.246. 
Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, 
Gerard Smith, p. 254. 
Plato's Modern Enemies and the 
Theory of Natural Law, Marianne M. 
Childress, p. 363. 
Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p.345. 
Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory 
of Natural Law, p. 252. 
The Challenge of Existentialism, p. 566. 
Human Freedom and Social Order, p. 268. 
I 
i Phenomenology and Philosophical Research 1) so, 51, 
I' i 2) 53, 54, I' J 
13) 54, 55, I l 60, 61, 14) 
I' ! 5) 64, 65, 
i f Philosophical 
~ 1) 1950, ! 
12) 1954, 
13) 1954, 
fl 
I 4) 
i 
1961, 
Review 
Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, 
Kubitz, p. 265. 
Plato's Modern Enemies and the 
Theory of Natural Law, Stallknecht, p. 426. 
The Return to Reason, Sellars, p. 104. 
Human Freedom and .Social Order, McGill, p. 407. 
Existence and the World of Freedom, 
Christianity and Existentialism, Langan, p. 438. 
Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, 
Roderick M. Chisholm, p. 391. 
The Return to Reason, Anthony Nemetz, p. 435. 
Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of 
Natural Law, Richard Robinson, p. 596. 
Human Freedom and Social Ord8~, J. Heywood Thomas, p. 
75 
I 
270. p, 
Jcu:rnal of Philosophy 
1) 1947, 
2) 1952, 
3) 1954, 
4) 1960, 
5) 1963' 
P .. l\.T~CLES 
What is Realism, 148-158. 
Tencency: The Ontological Ground of 
Ethics, 461-475 
K~. Wild's Ontology a~d Ethics, W. Earle, 
672-674. 
Ethics as a Rational Discipline and 
the Priority of the Good, 776-788. 
Existentialism as a philosophy, 45-62. 
The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, 664-677. 
Wild on Heidegger, 677-680. 
Phenomenology and Philosophical Research 
1) 40, 41, 
2) 40, 41, 
3) 40, 41, 
4) 42, 43, 
5) 43, 44, 
6) 47, 48, 
7) 47' 48, 
8) 47' 48, 
9) 48, 49, 
10) 53, 
The Concept of the Given in contemporary 
philosophy. 
Plato's Theory of TEXVN: A phenomenological 
Interpretation. 
Cornford's Plato and Parmenides. 
Discussions of Phenomenology. 
Discussion: Truth in the Contemporary Crisis. 
An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs. 
On Professor Ducasses' Explanation of 
His Theory of Semiosis. 
On the Distinction between the Analytic and 
the Synthetic. 
Comments on Hr. Hartman's "The Epistemology 
of the A ?riori. 11 
An Examination of Critical Realism with 
Special Refe:rence to ~ir. C. D. Broad' s 
Theory of Sensa. 
76 
I 
i 
I I 
I ~ 
I 
1.1) 59, 
12) 61, 
13) 63, 
Philosophical Review 
1) 56 
2) 58 
Contemporary Phenomenology and the 
Problem of Existence. 
A Reply to Mr. Gale. 
Reply to Fr. Adelmann and Prof. Schrag. 
The Existence and Nature of God (A Review). 
Is There a World of Ordinary Language? 
Review of Metaphysics 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
' 
47' 48, 
48, 49, 
48, 49, 
50, 51, 
52, 53, 
53, 54, 
54, 55, 
57, 58, 
62, 63, 
63' 64, 
64, 65, 
Existentialism Old and New, 80-92. 
Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity, 65-77. 
A Realistic Defense of Causal Efficacy, 1-14. 
The Divine Existence: An Answer to Mr. 
Hartshorne, 61-84. 
Barber's Realistic Analysis of Possibility, 
487 - 500. 
The New Empiricism and Human Time, 537-557. 
Comments on Weiss's Theses, 673-675. 
Weiss's Four-fold Universe, 610-636. 
An English Version of Martin Heidegger's 
Being and Time, 296-315. r 
Being and Time: A Reply, 610-616. 
Being, Meaning and the World, 411-429. 
77 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by David Goicoechea has been 
read and approved by the director of the thesis • FW'thermore, 
the final copies have been examined by the director and the 
signature which appears below verifies the fact that any 
necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the 
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content 
and form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts • 
ft!{ c 
oate Signature of Adviser 
